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INTRODUCTION

Massive piracy and counterfeiting have been perennial problems
for China. Although these problems existed long before China
reestablished trade and diplomatic ties with the outside world in the
late 1970s,l they continue to haunt China today-even after the

* Copyright © 2011 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law and
Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School; Wenlan Scholar
Chair Professor. Zhongnan University of Economics and Law. An earlier version of this
Article was delivered as the keynote opening address at the Oregon Review of
International Law Symposium on "China's Role in Regulating the Global Information
Economy" and at the Colloquium on China and International Law at the University of
Chicago Law School. The Author would like to thank Tom Ginsburg and Eric Priest for
their kind invitations and hospitality; Sharon Barner, Mark Cohen, Rob Faris, Eric Priest,
and Mark Wu for their valuable comments and suggestions. He is also grateful to Linzey
Bachmeier and Lindsey Purdy for excellent research and editorial assistance.
1 See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 34-55 (1995) (discussing
intellectual property problems in the late Qing and Republican periods).
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country has joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) . In a recent
report, the International Trade Commission estimated that "firms in
the U.S. [intellectual property]-intensive economy that conducted
business in China in 2009 reported losses of approximately $48.2
billion in sales, royalties, or license fees due to IPR [intellectual
property right] infringement in China. ' ,3 One therefore cannot help but
wonder why China remains such a rogue player in the international
4
intellectual property arena.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, China has been quite compliant
with international intellectual property norms. Out of the twenty-four
treaties administered solely by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO),5 China is a member of fifteen6 close to twothirds of the total number available for ratification and two more than
the United States. While the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has
2 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2005 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON

FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 95 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 NTE REPORT] (noting the
intellectual property enforcement problems in China).
3 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUBLICATION No. 4226, CHINA: EFFECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON

THE U.S. ECONOMY xiv (2011) (internal cross reference omitted). available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf
4 See James V. Feinerman, Chinese Participationin InternationalLegal Order: Rogue
Elephant or Team Player, in CHINA'S LEGAL REFORMS 198, 201 (Stanley Lubman ed.,
1996) (asking whether China will be a "rogue elephant" or a team player).
5 See WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD 1NTELL. PROP. ORG.. http://www.wipo.int
/treaties/en/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (providing a list of all twenty-four WIPOadministered treaties).
6 See discussion infra Part 1.The eight agreements to which China is not a signatory
are: (1) the Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying
Signals Transmitted by Satellite ("Brussels Convention"); (2) the Hague Agreement
Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs; (3) the Lisbon Agreement
for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International Registration; (4) the
Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on
Goods; (5) the Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol; (6) the Patent
Law Treaty; (7) the Rome Convention; and (8) the Vienna Agreement Establishing an
International Classification of the Figurative Elements of Marks. See ContractingParties,
WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/SearchForm.jsp?search what C (select "China" in
the "Select Contracting Party" drop-down menu and perform a search) (last visited Oct. 5,
2011).
7 Except for the Brussels Convention and the Patent Law Treaty. the United States did
not sign those WlPO-administered treaties to which China is not a signatory. The United
States also failed to join three agreements to which China is a signatory: (1)the Locarno
Agreement Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs: (2) the
Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits; and (3) the
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks. See Contracting
Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en!SearchForm.jsp?search what C (select
"United States of America" in the "Select Contracting Party" drop-down menu and
perform a search) (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
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recently found China in violation of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights' (TRIPS Agreement), 9 the
country quickly remedied the problems by amending both its
Copyright Law and Customs Regulations.10 China's quick remedial
actions stand in sharp contrast to the United States' continued refusal
to implement the panel recommendations in two adverse WTO
decisions concerning the TRIPS Agreement."'
This Article scrutinizes China's participation in the international
intellectual property regime and its role in both the WTO and WIPO.
Part I discusses China's engagement with international intellectual
property norms before its accession to the WTO in December 2001. It
points out that China is not the "norm breaker" one typically infers
from its disappointing record of intellectual property protection.
Instead, the country should be viewed as a "norm taker," having
accepted most of the WIPO-administered intellectual property treaties
available for ratification.
Parts I to IV identify three distinct phases in which China engages
with international intellectual property norms following its accession
to the WTO. These Parts examine in detail the three possible roles
China can play in this area: (1) norm taker; (2) norm shaker; and (3)
norm maker. 12 These Parts show that, although China began primarily
8 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15. 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 108 Stat.
4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
9 See Panel Report, China Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights
8.1. WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26. 2009) [hereinafter Panel
Report].
10 See Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1091 92,
1097-98 (2011) (discussing the amendments to Article 4 of the Chinese Copyright Law
and Article 27 of the Chinese Customs Regulations).
II See Appellate Body Report, United States Section 211 Omnibus AppropriationsAct
of 1998. WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2. 2002): Panel Report, United States Section 211
Omnibus AppropriationsAct of 1998, WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001); Panel Report, United
States Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DSI60/R (June 15, 2000); see also
Peter K. Yu,Are Developing Countries Playing a Better TRIPS Game?. 16 UCLA J. INT'L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing the United States' failure to
implement these panel reports); cf John H. Jackson, The Impact of China' Accession to
the

WTO, in CHINA AND THE

WORLD TRADING

SYSTEM: ENTERING

THE NEW

MILLENNIUM 19. 28 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM] ("[W]ho says the United States and the European Union are
always very good citizens? In relation to China's handling of treaty obligations. China's
record is not perfect, but it is also not any worse than that of any of the other WTO
members.").
12 Other commentators have used variations of this quadripartite breaker-taker-shakermaker formula to analyze China's compliance with international economic law or public
international law. See, e.g., Henry Gao, China's Ascent in Global Trade Governance:
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as a norm taker, it has slowly added the roles of a norm shaker and a
norm maker in later phases. While China will continue to play
different roles in the near future, the predominant role it plays will
vary from phase to phase. This Article concludes with some brief
observations concerning China's impact on the future development of
the international intellectual property regime.
I
PRE-WTO ERA
Commentators have identified three distinct phases in which
developing countries participated in the international intellectual
property regime.' 3 The first phase began during the colonial era, when
developing countries were still colonies, protectorates, or dependent
territories of major European powers. By virtue of this subservient
relationship, developing countries took on obligations accepted by the
controlling powers.' 4 Commitments made under such arrangements
included obligations arising from the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property' 5 (Paris Convention) and the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works1 6 (Berne
Convention), the two cornerstones of the international intellectual
property regime.
The second phase began when developing countries adjusted their
international intellectual property relationship in view of their
From Rule Taker to Rule Shaker and, Maybe Rule Maker?, in MAKING GLOBAL TRADE
GOVERNANCE

WORK

FOR DEVELOPMENT:

PERSPECTIVES

AND PRIORITIES

FROM

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 153 (Carolyn Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011).
13 See, e.g.. CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES 34 (2009) (noting that "developing countries participated in the international
[intellectual property] system through three phases. from the colonial era up until the close
of the Uruguay Round"); Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual
Property: Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual
Property System, 7 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 315, 320-41 (2003) (identifying three
distinct periods of intellectual property multilateralism: (1) The Era of
Imperialism/Colonialism, 1500s 1945; (2) The Era of Formalism, 1945 1990s; and (3)
The Era of Consolidation. 1994-current).
14 See SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 1107 10 (2d ed. 2006)

(discussing the Berne Convention in relation to foreign colonies, protectorates. and other
dependent territories): Okediji, supra note 13. at 320-25 (discussing the extension of
intellectual property obligations from metropolitan states to their colonies).
15Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14. 1967).
16 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886. 25
U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971).
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newfound independence.' 7 Such adjustment led to a wide variety of
pro-development initiatives, such as the drafting of the Protocol
Regarding Developing Countries to the Berne Convention, 8 the
formation of WIPO as a United Nations specialized agency, the
establishment of the draft International Code of Conduct on the
Transfer of Technology under the auspices of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 and efforts to
revise the Paris Convention. 0
In an earlier article, I described these initiatives collectively as the
"Old Development Agenda." 21 Although developing countries
obtained some moderate success with this agenda, the protection of
their interests remained rather limited. Despite considerable efforts,
they were unable to adjust protection levels based on their needs,
interests, conditions, and priorities2. They also failed to secure more
transfer of technology and knowledge, and greater protection against
abuse of rights and restraints on trade.
The third phase began when developing countries joined their more
23
developed counterparts in the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement.
Many commentators consider this agreement a "sea change" or

17 As Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg recount in relation to the Berne Convention:

[I]n the years immediately following [World War II], the process of decolonization
brought into existence a large number of new independent states, notably in Africa
and Asia. The majority of these had previously been subject to the provisions of the
Berne Convention as dependent territories of metropolitan states that were
members of the Berne Union. The question which therefore faced these new states
was whether they would now continue as members in their own right, or would
withdraw from the Union.
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 14, at 885.
1s Protocol Regarding Developing Countries to the Berne Convention for the Protection

of Literary and Artistic Works. Sept. 9. 1886 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967).
19Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology. United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/33 (1981).
20 See generally Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 465, 468-511 (2009) (providing a detailed discussion of these pro-development
initiatives).
21 Id.at 468.
22 See id. at 477 84 (noting the limited success in efforts to establish the Stockholm
Protocol to the Berne Convention) id. at 497-505 (noting the limited success in efforts to
negotiate the International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology).
23 See generallyDANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND

ANALYSIS 3-27 (3d ed. 2008) (describing the origins and development of the TRIPS
Agreement): JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11-47 (2001) (recounting the negotiation process for the TRIPS
Agreement): Peter K. Yu. TRIPs and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. 1NTELL. PROP. L. REV.
369, 371-79 (2006) (examining four different accounts of the origins of the TRIPS
Agreement).
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"tectonic shift" in international intellectual property law. 24 The
Agreement's impact on developing countries is indeed far-reaching.
For the first time, it introduced comprehensive norms concerning a
large variety of intellectual property areas in a single multilateral
agreement.25 Among the rights implicated are copyrights and related
rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs,
patents, plant variety protection, layout designs of integrated circuits,
and the protection of trade secrets and other forms of undisclosed
information.26
Unlike other developing countries, China's path of norm
engagement in the international intellectual property regime did not
follow these three distinct phases. Such deviation was not caused by
the incompatibilities between the Confucian culture and intellectual
property rights, a topic of considerable scholarly interest. 2' Instead,
China's lack of participation in the international intellectual property
24 See,

e.g., FREDERICK M. ABBOTT

ET AL.,

INTERNATIONAL

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 3 (2007) (stating that "It]he TRIPS

Agreement represented a sea change in the international regulation of 1PRs"); Charles R.
McManis, Teaching Current Trends and Future Developments in Intellectual Property, 52
ST. Louis U. L.J. 855, 856 (2008) (noting that "the field of international intellectual
property law underwent a tectonic shift with the promulgation of the [TRIPS
Agreement]").
25 See Peter K. Yu, Teaching InternationalIntellectual PropertyLaw, 52 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 923. 930-31 (2008).
26 See TRIPS Agreement arts. 9-39. Because the TRIPS Agreement incorporates by
reference the Paris Convention, it arguably could implicate rights concerning trade names,
utility models, and various forms of unfair competition. Id. art. 2.1 ("Members shall
comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19. of the Paris Convention (1967).").
27 See, e.g.. ALFORD. supra note 1. at 19-29 (discussing how the Confucian culture
prevented intellectual property protection from taking root in imperial China); Peter K.
Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure
the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 1. 16-21 (2001)
[hereinafter Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives] (discussing Confucianism as a
partial impediment to improving intellectual property protection and enforcement in
China). Although Confucianism has been widely cited in legal literature as an explanation
for copyright piracy and counterfeiting in China, recent literature and historical and
empirical evidence suggest that commentators may have overstated the impact of
Confucianism on China's reception of international intellectual property norms. See Peter
K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012); see also Ken Shao, The Global Debates on Intellectual Property:
What If ChinaIs Not a Born Pirate?, 2010 INTELL. PROP. Q. 341 (questioning the impact
of Confucianism on intellectual property protection and enforcement in China); Shi Wei,
Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an Elegant Offense?, 32
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1. 4 (2006) (pointing out that "current mainstream legal
epistemology incorrectly links China's enforcement problem to Confucian values"); Peter
K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 127, 131-34 (2003) (explaining why copyright piracy is not merely a
cultural problem).
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arena was the result of autarky and isolationist policies practiced by
Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders following the founding of the
People's Republic of China in 1949. 8
Having been born at the end of dynastic rule in imperial China and
having experienced a long period of exploitation, unfair treatment,
and humiliation by foreign powers,29 the founding Chinese leaders
unsurprisingly questioned the legitimacy and expediency of the
contemporary international legal order. 30 At that time, many leaders
harbored "a burning desire to restore China's rightful position under
the sun, to achieve the big power status denied it since the Opium
War, and to revive the national confidence and self-respect that had
been lost during a century of foreign humiliation.",3' It is therefore no
surprise that China declined to actively participate in an international
regime that demanded the surrender of some of the sovereignty it had
painfully regained.3 2
28 See Peter K. Yu, From Piratesto Partners:ProtectingIntellectual Property in China
in the Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 198 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From
Pirates to Partners] ("During the Mao era. China made a similar mistake by withdrawing
completely from the global economy. Practicing self-reliance and import substitution,
China sought to produce domestically those products it traditionally imported."); accord
Feinerman, supra note 4, at 186 (noting China's "isolation which was by turns selfimposed and externally enforced").
29 See generally IMMANUEL C.Y. HSG, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 139 219, 295
350, 387-406 (6th ed. 2000) (providing an in-depth discussion of the "century of
humiliation").
30 CHIU HUNGDAH, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES

72 74 (1972) (noting the debate among Communist Chinese writers in the late 1950s over
the treatment of two separate systems of international law-one bourgeois and the other
socialist).
31 HSU, supra note 29, at 660 61.
32 See James Li Zhaojie, Commentary on "China and the InternationalLegal System:
Challenges of Participation," in CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, NEW

CHALLENGES 162, 163 (Donald C. Clarke ed., 2008) [hereinafter CHINA'S LEGAL
SYSTEM] ("China's policy of integrating with the international system . . . follows a
sovereignty-centered and state-empowering model."). As one commentator observes,
China's effort to manage its engagement with the outside world involves the following
tensions:
* To join "the club" of leading nation-states, but on China's own terms of
membership;
* To participate
6sovereignty";

in

international

"regimes"

without

* To garner the benefits of advanced technologies
6negative" consequences;

sacrificing

national

without accepting their

* To encourage entrepreneurial flair and market flexibility without absorbing the
materialistic self-indulgence and cultural decadence that seem to come with
modern capitalism (in short, to take what is deemed "good" from the outside
world, and to filter out what is "bad").
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In the late 1970s, however, China began to realize that the selfreliance and import substitution policies had left the country
economically poor and technologically backward.33 As Henry
Kissinger recounts: "On Mao's death, America's total trade with
China amounted to $336 million, slightly lower than the level of
America's trade with Honduras and one-tenth of America's trade with
Taiwan, - • which
had approximately 1.6 percent of China's
,,34
population.
Following Mao's death and the demise of the infamous Gang of
Four, Deng Xiaoping and his fellow leaders reopened the country to
foreign trade. 35 In addition to normalizing the country's diplomatic
relationships with the outside world,36 China adopted new policies to
develop world-class strengths in agriculture, industry, science and
technology, and 37
national defense, known collectively as the "Four
Modernizations.,,
To promote trade with the outside world, China and the United
States signed the Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United
States of America and the People's Republic of China in 1979.38
Calling for reciprocal protection of copyrights, patents, and
trademarks, this agreement "marked the beginning of Western
intellectual property protection in post-Mao China. ' 39 Article VI(3) of
the Agreement provided that "each Party shall seek, under its laws
and with due regard to international practice, to ensure to legal or
natural persons of the other Party protection of patents and

Frederick S. Tipson, China and the Information Revolution, in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD:
PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 231, 232 (Elizabeth Economy & Michel Oksenberg eds.,
1999).
33 See Yu, From Piratesto Partners.supra note 28. at 198 ("By the late 1970s, China
had concluded that this self-reliant policy was ineffective. It had led to high-cost,
ineffective domestic production. and China remained a backward country with limited
foreign technology and capital.").
34 HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 333 (2011). For comparison purposes, the total

volume of trade between China and the United States amounted to $456.8 billion in 2010.
US-China Trade Statistics and China's World Trade Statistics, US-CHINA Bus. CouNcIL.
https://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
35 See HS0, supra note 29, at 858 69 (discussing the "open door" policy adopted in
December 1978).
36 See id. at 785-802 (discussing China's efforts to normalize its diplomatic
relationships with the outside world).
37 See id. at 803 14 (discussing the Four Modernizations).
38 Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the
People's Republic of China, U.S.-China. July 7. 1979. 31 U.S.T. 4652 [hereinafter 1979
Agreement].
39 Yu, From Piratesto Partners, supra note 28, at 136.
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trademarks equivalent to the patent and trademark protection
correspondingly accorded by the other Party.,, 40 Article VI(5) further
stipulated that "each Party shall take appropriate measures, under its
laws and regulations and with due regard to international practice, to
ensure to legal or natural persons of the other Party protection of
copyrights equivalent to the41 copyright protection correspondingly
accorded by the other Party.
A year after the signing of this agreement, China became a member
of WIPO. 42 In 1982, China promulgated its first trademark law, which
was followed two years later by a patent law.43 Although a
contentious debate erupted over the expediency of patent protection
and the appropriateness of establishing private rights in a socialist
environment, Chinese leaders eventually concluded that having
stronger intellectual property protection would be in the country's
best interest. 44 In 1985, China joined the Paris Convention, 45 which
lays out the international intellectual property norms in both the
patent and trademark areas. Four years later, China also joined the
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
46
Marks
(Madrid Agreement), which streamlines the trademark
application process in member states.
Compared with patents and trademarks, China's path to join the
international copyright family has been much longer and more
arduous. 4' Due in large part to China's strong information control
policy 4 ' and its continued
reluctance to introduce private rights into a
socialist environment,49 the country did not establish a new copyright

40 1979 Agreement. supra note 38, art. V1(3).
41 Id. art. V1(5).
42 Contracting Parties, WIPO,

http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang
=en&treatyid= I (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
43 See Yu, From Piratesto Partners.supra note 28, at 136.
44 For discussions of the challenges in developing the 1984 Patent Law, see generally
ALFORD, supra note 1, at 67 74; David Ben Kay, Comment, The Patent Law of the
People's Republic of China in Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 331 (1985).
45 Contracting Parties, W1PO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang
en&treaty id 2 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
46 Contracting Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang
=en&treatyid=21 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
47 See ALFORD, supra note 1. at 77 (quoting Wang Hanbin. the vice president of the
National People's Congress, as describing the drafting of the 1990 Copyright Law as "the
most complicated").
48 See Yu, Piracy,Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 27, at 28 32 (discussing the
Chinese censorship and information control policy).
49 See ALFORD, supra note 1, at 70 (discussing the uneasiness of introducing private
intellectual property rights into a socialist environment).
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system until the early 1990s.50 Although American firms had been
fairly patient in the first few years following China's reopening,"
they became increasingly concerned about the widespread piracy and
counterfeiting problems in China.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, these firms began to pressure the U.S.
government to take more proactive actions to protect their intellectual
property interests in China.5 2 The timing of their demands could not
have been better; the United States already had a huge trade deficit,
and the industries were working closely with their European and
Japanese counterparts to push for the establishment of the TRIPS
Agreement in the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (Uruguay
53
Round).
On May 19, 1989, amidst student protests in Tiananmen Square,
China and the United States signed its first ever memorandum of
understanding (MOU) concerning the protection of intellectual
property rights.5 4 Although this MOU called for stronger protection of
computer software, commentators seldom mentioned this document,
due largely to the unrelated sanctions the United States and the
international community imposed on China shortly after the
Tiananmen incident. 55
50 See Yu, From Piratesto Partners.supra note 28, at 141.
51 See id. at 137 ("in the beginning, the United States was willing to compromise its
intellectual property rights, because the country was eager to lure China into the 'family of
nations."').
52 See Warren H. Maruyama. U.S.-China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual
Property, and the Rule of Law in a Global Economy, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 165, 186 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999) ("At a 1985
meeting to the U.S.-China Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), the U.S. for
the first time expressed concerns about weak Chinese IPR standards. In 1987, the U.S. put
IPR protection on the agenda for U.S.-China market access talks.").
53 For detailed discussions of the private sector's active involvement in the
development of the TRIPS Agreement, see generally DUNCAN MATTHEWS. GLOBALISING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002); SUSAN K. SELL,
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS (2003).

54 Memorandum of Understanding Between the People's Republic of China and the
United States, U.S.-China, May 19, 1989, reprintedin PRC Agrees to Pushfor Copyright
Law that Will Protect Computer Software. WORLD 1NTELL. PROP. REP., July 1989. at 151.
55 See Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor Is Far Away: China's Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights Protection, 1986 2006, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231, 235 (2006);
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:

STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 186 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007)
[hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle]: see also ALFORD. supra note 1, at 121 (criticizing the
United States for giving more priority to intellectual property protection than to human
rights protection in negotiating the 1989 MOU).
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Despite these sanctions and a turbulent relationship with the United
16
States, China enacted its first Copyright Law in 1990."7 A year later,
China promulgated a separate set of computer software regulations] 8
Although these enactments succeeded in improving China's
relationship with the United States, they were too little, too late for
American rights holders.
In April 1991, the United States designated China as a Priority
Foreign Country through the Section 301 process. 59 To increase its
leverage, the U.S. administration threatened to impose retaliatory
tariffs of $1.5 billion on Chinese textiles, shoes, electronic
instruments, and pharmaceuticals.60 China quickly responded with
countersanctions of a similar amount on American commodities, such
as aircraft, cotton, corn, steel, and chemicals. 6 1 Hours before the
deadline for imposing sanctions, both63 countries averted a potential
trade war62 by signing a second MOU.
Pursuant to this new MOU, China amended both its copyright and
patent laws. 64 China also joined the Berne Convention,65 the Geneva
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
56 See ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN

CONTEMPORARY CHINA 42 (2005) ("One outcome of the worldwide condemnation of the
PRC [following the Tiananmen incident] was that 'it
was impossible to get the USTR to
even talk to China between June 1989 and autumn 1990."' (quoting documented but
undisclosed interview)).
57 See Yu, From Piratesto Partners,supra note 28, at 141.
58 See id.
59 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 1995 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 47, 54 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 NTE REPORT].

60 Sheryl WuDunn, Nonstate Plants in China at Risk in U.S. Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 1992, at A9.
61 David Holley, China Warns of Trade War with U.S. over Patents, Copyrights, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 8. 1992, atA6.
62 Stuart Auerbach, China, U.S. Reach Trade Accord, Beijing Agrees to Curb Piracy of
Products, Safeguarded Material, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1992, at A24; Keith Bradsher,
U.S. and China Reach Accord on Copying,N.Y. TIMES. Jan. 17, 1992. at D1.
63 Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property. Jan. 17.
1992, U.S.-China, T.I.A.S. No. 12036 (1995).
64 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 28, at 142. "The amended copyright
statute protects computer software programs as literary works for fifty years: removes
formalities on copyright protection; and extends protection to all works originating in a
Berne Convention country, including sound recordings in the public domain." Id.at 143.
"The new patent law extends the duration of patent protection from fifteen to twenty
years; affords protection to all chemical inventions, including pharmaceuticals and
agrichemical products; and sharply restricts the availability of compulsory licenses." Id.at
142.
65 Contracting Parties, W1PO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang
=en&treatyid= 15 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
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Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms
(Phonograms
Treaty), and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). 6 ' After a decade of
reforms following the reopening of its market, China finally became a
member of the international copyright family.
Although the U.S.-China intellectual property relationship
improved considerably following the signing of the second MOU, the
relationship quickly deteriorated. On June 30, 1994, the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) again designated China as a Priority
Foreign Country through the Section 301 process. 68 The next year, the
U.S. administration threatened to impose 100 percent tariffs on over
$1 billion worth of Chinese imports, ranging from plastic picture
69
frames to cellular telephones. In retaliation, China issued a counterthreat of 100 percent tariffs on American-made compact discs,
cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and other products. 7° China also
announced its intention to suspend negotiations with American
automakers over the creation of joint ventures in China for
manufacturing minivans and passenger cars, one of the top trade
priorities of the Clinton administration. 7'
As with the encounter three years ago, China and the United States
again reached an agreement in the eleventh hour. 2 With a repeat
pattern and another follow-up "agreement" in 1996, 73 the back and
forth negotiations between the two countries have created what I have
described as the "cycle of futility." In this cycle, China and the United
66 Contracting Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang
en&treaty id 18 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
67 Contracting Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang
=en&treatyid=6 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
68 1995 NTE REPORT, supra note 59, at 54.
69 Martha M. Hamilton, U.S. to Hit Chinawith Stiff Tariffs, WASH. POST, Feb. 5. 1995,
atAl.
70

Id.

71 David E. Sanger, President Imposes Trade Sanctions on Chinese Goods, N.Y.
TiMES, Feb. 5. 1995, at Al.
72 Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26. 1995, U.S.-China. 34
I.L.M. 881 (1995). This agreement appeared in the form of an "exchange of letters" with
an attached action plan.
73 Trade Compliance Center. People's Republic of China Implementation of the 1995
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 1996 (June 17, 1996). available at
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade Agreements/All Trade Agreements/exp_005361 .asp.
This
"agreement" appeared in the form of a report on intellectual property enforcement actions
China conducted based on the 1995 Agreement. "The document included neither
significant new terms [in the intellectual property area] nor terms that improved market
access of American products; instead, it merely reaffirmed China's commitment to protect
intellectual property rights made under the intellectual property agreement signed the year
before." Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 55, at 187.
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States "repeatedly threatened each other with trade wars, only to back
down in the eleventh hour with a compromise that did not provide
sustained improvements in intellectual property protection. 7
While this futile cycle had undercut the efforts by the U.S.
government to strengthen intellectual property protection in China,
the latter did not slow down its participation in the international
intellectual property regime. By the end of the 1990s, China had
joined the Nice Agreement Concerning the International
Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the
Registration of Marks (Nice Agreement), the Budapest Treaty on the
International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the
Purposes of Patent Procedure (Budapest Treaty), the Protocol
Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks (Madrid Protocol), the Locarno Agreement
Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs
(Locarno Agreement), the Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the
International Patent Classification (Strasbourg Agreement), and the
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV Convention) (See Table 1). China had also joined the
Trademark Law Treaty, which still has not entered into force. It even
signed the Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of
Integrated Circuits (Washington Treaty). Although that treaty has

74 Peter K. Yu,From Pirates to Partners (Episode 11):
ProtectingIntellectualProperty
in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 904 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to
Partners11].
As 1described earlier:
That cycle went as follows: The United States began by threatening China with
trade sanctions (often with an ancillary threat of nonrenewal of China's mostfavored-nation status). China responded with threats of retaliatory sanctions of a
similar amount. After several months of negotiations, both countries agreed to an
eleventh-hour compromise that usually led to a written document. While
intellectual property protection improved during the first few months immediately
following the agreements. piracy and counterfeiting problems worsened once
international attention was diverted. Within a short period of time, American
businesses again complained to the U.S. government, and the cycle repeated itself.
Peter K. Yu, Still Dissatisfied After All These Years: Intellectual Property, Post-WTO
China, and the Avoidable Cycle of Futility. 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 143. 149 (2005);
see also Yu,From Piratesto Partners,supra note 28, at 140-48 (discussing this "cycle of
futility").
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since been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement," its obsolescence
has made it difficult to obtain the needed ratifications. 6
TABLE

1. List of international treaties to which China has become a
signatory

06/03/1980
03/19/1985
10/04/1989
05/01/1990
10/15/1992
04/30/1993
01/01/1994
08/09/1994
10/28/1994
07/01/1995
12/01/1995
09/19/1996
06/19/1997
04/23/1999
01/29/2007
06/09/2007
06/09/2007

WIPO Convention (in force)
Paris Convention (in force)
Madrid Agreement (Marks) (in force)
Washington Treaty (signed, but not ratified)
Berne Convention (in force)
Phonograms Convention (in force)
Patent Cooperation Treaty (in force)
Nice Agreement (in force)
Trademark Law Treaty (signed, but not in force)
Budapest Treaty (in force)
Madrid Protocol (in force)
Locarno Agreement (in force)
Strasbourg Agreement (in force)
UPOV Convention (in force)
Singapore Treaty (signed, but not in force)
WIPO Copyright Treaty (in force)
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (in force)

Source: ContractingParties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/SearchForm
.jsp?search what C (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).

In sum, before its accession to the WTO, China had signed most of
the WIPO-administered treaties available for ratification. Out of all
the treaties the United States had joined at that time, the only
agreement China failed to sign was the Brussels Convention Relating
to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by
75 See TRIPS Agreement art. 35 ("Members agree to provide protection to the layoutdesigns (topographies) of integrated circuits ... in accordance with Articles 2 through 7
(other than paragraph 3 of Article 6). Article 12 and paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits ....
").
76 Cf Leon Radomsky, Sixteen Y ears After the Passageof the U.S. Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act: Is InternationalProtection Working?, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1049,
1052 (2000) ("[B]y the time [provisions protecting integrated circuit layouts] were in
place, they were largely obsolete."); Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the
InternationalIntellectual PropertyRegime. 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 323, 378 (2004) (noting
that the U.S. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act "was arguably obsolete by the time it
was enacted").
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Satellite." Meanwhile, China had joined the Madrid Agreement, the
Locarno Agreement, and the Washington Treaty-three agreements
the United States still has not joined. 78 Thus, as far as treaty
membership is concerned, China is not a rogue player but a rather
good citizen in the international intellectual property regime.
II
PHASE 1: TAKER

A. China as a Norm Taker
At the turn of this millennium, China actively revamped its
intellectual property system, in part to prepare for its accession to the
WTO. 7 9 The country amended its patent law in 2000 and its copyright
and trademark laws the year after.8 0 Although many of these
"millennium amendments" were introduced as a response to the
rapidly changing socio-economic and technological conditions in
China, they also helped the country meet the standards required by
the WTO. 1

See supra note 6.
supra note 7.
79 As Xue Hong and Zheng Chengsi declare:
In general, China's entry to the WTO significantly influenced the speed and scope
of the development of the Chinese 1P [intellectual property] law system. It is
interesting to note that IP rights reforms kept pace with Chinese WTO negotiations.
When the negotiations encountered obstacles, the 1P rights reform slowed down;
when the negotiations reached agreements to promote the accession process, the IP
rights reform accelerated noticeably. Since China has become a member of the
WTO, Chinese IP law reform has also peaked.
XUE HONG & ZHENG CHENGSI, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST
CENTURY xxxix (2002).
80 Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective Nov. 1,
2001); Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Aug. 25, 2000, effective July 1,
2001); Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 23. 1982. amended Oct. 27. 2001, effective Dec. 1,
2001).
81 As I wrote earlier:
77

78 See

While the amendments were undeniably introduced at a time when China
prepared to enter the WTO. it is an overstatement, or a half-truth, to claim that the
amendments were introduced primarily to conform the Chinese intellectual
property system to WTO standards. Such a statement would ignore the important
changes in the socialist market economy, the internal dynamics of the intellectual
property lawmaking process, and contributions of the local stakeholders in the legal
reforms.
Yu, From Piratesto Partners II, supra note 74, at 914.
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During the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar,
China was finally admitted to the international trading body.8 2 After
fifteen years of arduous negotiations, the country formally became the
WTO's 143rd member on December H1, 2001.3 As part of its entry
price, China took on not only obligations under the TRIPS Agreement
but also additional WTO-plus commitments. 84 As a result, in the first
few years following the accession, China focused its attention,
energy, and resources primarily on playing the role of a norm takera role it has assumed and excelled at long before it joined the WTO.
In ensuing years, however, China slowly changed its approach to
participation in the WTO. Such a change could be attributed to a large
number of factors, including: a growing familiarity with WTO rules
and procedures; a considerable increase in economic strength,
industrial and scientific prowess, and research capabilities; more
willingness to take on the role of a major power; greater success in
resolving WTO-related problems within the country; and a new
leadership and changing domestic elite politics. This Part focuses on
the first phase of China's norm engagement, while the next two will
discuss the two later phases.
In Phase 1, China's approach was similar to the approach it took
before the WTO accession. Acting primarily as a norm taker, 85 the
82 See Symposium, China and the WTO: Progress,Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 1, 2 (2003) [hereinafter China and the WTO] (remarks of the Author).
83 Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto
e/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm (last visited Sept. 19. 2011).
84 See Samuel S. Kim, China in World Politics, in DOES CHINA MATTER? A
REASSESSMENT: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF GERALD SEGAL 37, 49 (Barry Buzan &
Rosemary Foot eds.. 2004) [hereinafter DOES CHINA MATTER?] ("In a few important
areas, China assumed obligations that exceed normal WTO standards-the so-called
WTO-plus commitments."); Julia Ya Qin, China, India and WTO Law, in CHINA, INDIA
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 167, 173-75 (Muthucumaraswamy
Somarajah & Wang Jiangyu eds.. 2010) (outlining China's "'WTO-plus' rules").
85 See, e.g., Margaret M. Pearson, China in Geneva: Lessonsfrom China's Early Years
in the World Trade Organization, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF CHINA'S

FOREIGN POLICY 242, 242 (Robert S. Ross & Alastair lain Johnston eds., 2006) ("The
evidence ... suggests that China is far from revisionist. Rather, for the most part, China
has been a system maintainer, the exception being its behaviour on issues seen to impinge
on its sovereignty and dignity."). It is worth noting that China plays the role of a norm
taker in a more nuanced fashion. As Pitman Potter describes, China takes the norms by
engaging in "selective adaptation" based on local conditions:
Applied to China, selective adaptation analysis permits understanding of local
responses to international legal obligations. China's interpretation and
implementation of international agreements in trade, such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and agreements associated with the ...
WTO . . . . for example, will depend on the extent to which interpretive
communities comprising government officials, socio-economic and professional
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country kept a rather low profile in the international intellectual
property arena. 86 For example, when Brazil and Argentina made their
now famous proposal for the establishment of the WIPO
Development Agenda, 87 China declined to join them, even though it
arguably was one of the major leaders in the developing world.
Likewise, when developed countries advanced their proposals for
higher enforcement standards at the Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Council), China's
protests were limited to the rejection of the developed countries'
proposals and additional interventions explaining why enforcement
discussions
in the Council
would
be inappropriate
or

elites, and other privileged groups exercising authority borne of political and/or
professional position, specialized knowledge. and/or socio-economic statusassimilate norms of trade liberalization.
Influenced by their training and education, members of China's interpretive
communities bring their perceptions about international law and relations to bear in
responding to the requirements of international rule regimes. Perceptions
contrasting China's colonial past and resulting weakness in foreign relations with
its current strengths tend to encourage both a sense of grievance and of
opportunities for correction and redress. Perception dynamics are also evident in
academic and policy assessments of the international legal system that
acknowledge the challenges posed by globalization for sovereignty imperatives of
the nation-state generally, and focus on the intrusive nature of international regimes
whose underlying norms are seen as a challenge to China. Such perceptions affect
the reception of international legal standards by local interpretive communities, and
ultimately China's responses of implementation.
Pitman B. Potter, China and the InternationalLegal System: Challenges of Participation,
in CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 32, at 145, 147-48 (footnotes omitted): accord
Wu Handong. One Hundred Years of Progress: The Development of the Intellectual
Property System in China, I WIPO J. 117, 118 19 (2009) (discussing the stage of
"selective arrangement in light of domestic development"): see also Tipson, supra note
32, at 232 ("Th[e] attempt to borrow selectively from outsiders is a familiar one in
Chinese history.").
86 Cf C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA'S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

224 (2008) [hereinafter BERGSTEN ET AL.. CHINA'S RISE] ("To date.... China's interest
in keeping a relatively low profile, focusing inward, and reassuring the world about the
implications of its rise has led to a reluctance to take the lead in developing new global
institutions or challenging old ones for fear of attracting unwanted attention and taking on
new responsibilities that will create unnecessary distractions for itself."); KISSINGER,
supra note 34, at 490 ("Beijing's initial approach to the new era [presided by the fourthgeneration leadership] was largely incremental and conservative. . . .Its foreign policy
avoided dramatic moves, and its chief policymakers responded circumspectly to appeals
from abroad for China to play a more visible international leadership role.").
87WIPO, Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/31/11
(Aug. 27. 2004). available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/enlwo ga 31
/woga 311 .pdf.
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counterproductive. 8 China even balked when the United States
proposed to "issue a joint statement [with China] in support of the
Doha agenda." 89
While policymakers, industries, and commentators at this stage had
questioned China's compliance with its WTO obligations at times, 90
there was no denying that China actively undertook reforms to
facilitate greater compliance with WTO norms. Most Chinese
officials also subscribed to the view that joining the WTO was a long
and complicated process that required a lot of learning and continued
improvement even after the accession. 91
Similar to the first few years of China's reopening in the late
1970s, the United States and its industries were rather patient. Despite
industry complaints through the Section 301 process,92 the United
States did not put China back on to the Priority Watch List until after
April 2005, more than two years after the accession. 93 As the USTR
acknowledged in the 2005 National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers, "China has made significant progress in its
efforts to make its framework of laws, regulations and implementing
rules WTO-consistent, [although] serious problems remain,
particularly with China's enforcement of intellectual property
rights. 94
88 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 514-15
(2011) (recounting China's strong opposition to enforcement-related discussions at the
TRIPS Council).
89 Qin. supra note 84. at 188.
90 See Yu, From Piratesto PartnersIl, supra note 74, at 904.
91 See Pearson, supra note 85, at 257 ("With regard to China's potential for leadership,
Chinese diplomats have on most issues adopted a learning posture."); see also Li Yahong.
The Wolf Has Come: Are China'sIntellectualPropertyIndustries Preparedfor the WTO?.
20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 77, 104 (2002) (quoting Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, Chinese
Economists Fear Favored West May Threaten Sovereignty. S. CHINA MORNING POST.
Nov. 13. 2001) (describing the concern of Long Yongtu. the chief negotiator for China's
entry into the WTO, that "[1]acking expertise and professionals qualified on international
rules may make China[]... 'a blind man riding a blind horse' within the WTO").
92 See generally Joe Karaganis & Sean Flynn, Networked Governance and the USTR, in
MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING GOODS 75 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011) (critically evaluating
the USTR's Section 301 process); Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry's Influence on Intellectual
Property Negotiations and Special 301 Actions. 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87 (1994)
(discussing the operation of the Section 301 process and its relation to U.S. trade
negotiations).
93 See USTR, OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW RESULTS 8 (2005). available at
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document Library/Reports Publications/2005/2005
_Special_301 /asset upload file 195_7636.pdf.
94 2005 NTE REPORT, supra note 2, at 95; see also Massey, supra note 55, at 232
("Today, after four bilateral US-China agreements on IPR protection (1989, 1992, 1995,
and 1996) and China's accession to the World Trade Organization .... piracy in China is
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To be certain, by acceding to the WTO, China took on new
obligations concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Part III of the TRIPS Agreement, for example, contains twenty-one
articles laying out the WTO-wide intellectual property enforcement
norms. 95 Nevertheless, the vague, broad, and ambiguous nature of
these norms96 has made it difficult for the USTR to challenge China's
WTO compliance on enforcement grounds. 9' That challenge was
further exacerbated by the moratorium on non-violation complaints,98
which has been in force since the inception of the international
trading body.99
no longer primarily the result of the Beijing government's own actions. Rather, the major
continuing issue has been Beijing's failure to get its laws and international obligations
adequately and effectively enforced." (footnotes omitted)).
95 See TRIPS Agreement arts. 41 61.
96 See Yu, TRIPS and ItsAchilles' Heel, supra note 88, at 495 ("[T]he TRIPS
Agreement now contains many result-oriented terms that are vague, broad, and undefined.
Examples of these terms are ."effective", "reasonable". "undue", "unwarranted". "fair and
equitable", and "not . . .unnecessarily complicated or costly.'"' (quoting UNCTAD
ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 576 (2005))).
97 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners 11, supra note 74. at 931-38 (discussing the
difficulties of challenging China before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on
enforcement grounds).
98 Commentators have noted the usefulness of non-violation complaints for launching a
WTO challenge against China based on inadequate enforcement of intellectual property
rights. See Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Phs Agreements: The Potential Utility of
Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. 1NT'L ECON. L. 1023. 1059 (2009) ("Given the lack of detail
in the enforcement provisions the US argument was really more of a non-violation
complaint. The essence of what the USA was really complaining about was that a benefit
it expected from the TRIPS Agreement was better levels of enforcement."); Daniel
Stewart & Brett G. Williams. The Impact of China's WTO Membership on the Review of
the TRIPs Agreement, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 11,at
363, 367 ("On the basis of the possibility of claims on enforcement issues, one may expect
that China will join those countries which seek an extension of the moratorium on nonviolation complaints."); see also Daniel Gervais, China Alfeasures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 549, 549
(2009) (noting that the WTO panel's analysis in China may have "blurred both the
traditional distinction between 'as such' and 'as applied' claims and the line separating
TRIPS violations from non-violations").
99 Non-violation complaints provide WTO members with a helpful recourse against the
impairment of benefits in the event that a WTO member is unable to show any substantive
violation. Instead of focusing on the legality of a contested measure, this type of complaint
allows countries to focus on "the protection of expectations arising from reciprocal tariff
and market access concessions (in the GATT context) or from a Member's specific
commitments (in the GATS context)." UNCTAD ICTSD, supra note 96, at 655.
Nevertheless, due to the unprecedented nature of using the trade-based dispute settlement
process in the intellectual property context, a moratorium has been imposed on nonviolation complaints since the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. See Peter K. Yu, The
Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous. L. REV. 979, 1029-30
(2009); William New & Catherine Saez, Multilateral Trading System Under Scrutiny at
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Moreover, the U.S. administration understood the importance of
providing China with the time and wiggle room needed to conform its
system to WTO norms. Given the substantial changes China had
already undertaken in the run-up to the WTO accession, 1°° an
impatient push for greater reforms that ignored China's resources and
institutional capacities would have been counterproductive anyway.
Such a push was unlikely to result in meaningful protection to
intellectual property rights holders. In fact, greater patience could
have served the United States' long-term interests in promoting free
trade by providing China with the needed guidance as it made a
transition to full compliance with WTO rules.10 1
To complicate matters even further, in the first few years of
China's WTO membership, the world was still recovering from the
aftermath of the U.S. terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. At that
time, the WTO was also undergoing a period of adjustment and soulsearching following the launch of the Doha Development Round of
Trade Negotiations (Doha Round).10 2 In the same ministerial
conference that admitted China to the international trading body, the
WTO members adopted the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health 10 3 (Doha Declaration). Paragraph 6 of the Declaration
specifically instructed the TRIPS Council to devise an "expeditious
solution" to enable countries with insufficient or no manufacturing
10 4
capacity to import generic versions of on-patent pharmaceuticals.
In addition, Paragraph 7 extended the formal introduction of patent
protection for pharmaceuticals and of protection for undisclosed
clinical trial data to January 1,2016.105
A few years later, shortly before the Sixth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Hong Kong, the WTO members further extended the
transitional period for all TRIPS obligations to July 1, 2013, for those
WTO Ministerial, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Nov. 30. 2009). http://www.ip-watch.org
/weblog/2009/1 1/30/multi lateral-trade-system-under-scrutiny-at-wto-ministerial/.
100 See Shi Guangsheng, Introduction: Working Together for a Brighter Future Based
on Mutual Benefit, in CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 15, 15 (Henry Gao & Donald

Lewis eds., 2005) ("After joining the WTO, China first and foremost sorted out over 2,300
laws and regulations nationwide.").
101 See Yu, From Piratesto Partners11, supra note 74, at 942-45 (noting China's need
for guidance as it made a transition to full compliance with WTO rules).
102 See Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 20, at 512 15 (discussing
the Doha Round).
103 World Trade Organization. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001), 41 LL.M. 755 (2002).
104Id. 6.
105 Id. 7.
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least developed countries that had yet to meet the stated
requirements. °6 That extension provided these poor countries with an
additional transitional period of seven and a half years. Building on
efforts facilitated by the Doha Declaration, developing countries also
successfully pushed for the adoption of a protocol to formally amend
the TRIPS Agreement by introducing a new Article 31bis.10 7 If
ratified by two-thirds of the WTO membership,' the amendment
will enter into effect. The new provision will likely increase the
access to essential medicines in the developing world.
B. A Low Profile
Given China's considerable struggle with the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights, it is easy to understand
why the country accepted the role of a norm taker, rather than a norm
shaker or a norm maker. Interestingly, China's norm taker role was
not limited to the international intellectual property area. Except for
some sensitive areas, where sovereignty was involved, China has
consistently assumed a low profile in international regimes and
multilateral organizations. Thus, apart from its continued struggle
with piracy and counterfeiting, China's behavior in this phase can be
attributed to several additional factors.
First, the primary focus of the Chinese leadership is domestic,
rather than international. °9 Since its accession to the WTO, China has
experienced a large number of domestic problems, including
decreasing control by the state, decentralization of the central
government, significant losses suffered by inefficient state-owned
enterprises, a widening gap between the rich and the poor and
between urban and rural areas, massive urban migration, widespread
and massive unemployment, rampant corruption, and growing unrest

106 Press Release, WTO, Poorest Countries Given More Time to Apply Intellectual
Property Rules (Nov. 29, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news e
/pres05 e/pr424 e.htm.
107 General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005).
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/trips e/wt1641 e.htm; see also Peter K.
Yu, The InternationalEnclosure Afovement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 872 86 (2007) (discussing
the origins and content of the proposed Article 3 Ibis of the TRIPS Agreement).
108 As of this writing, slightly more than a third of the 153 WTO member states.,
including the United States, India, Japan, China, and members of the European Union,
have ratified the proposed amendment. See Aembers Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS
Agreement, WTO (Mar. 15, 2011). http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/trips e
/amendment e.htm.
109 See ROBERT G. SUTTER, CHINA'S RISE IN ASIA: PROMISES AND PERILS 53 (2005).
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in both the cities and the countryside." 0 Compared with these
domestic problems, intellectual property piracy and counterfeiting
was not of a sufficiently high priority on the national policy agenda.
As Robert Sutter explains, against a background of social and
economic uncertainties brought about by China's accession to the
WTO, the Asian financial crisis, and growing political dissent,
"foreign affairs generally remained an area of less urgent policy
priority."' ' ' This approach can be traced back to Beijing's gradual
shift in focus in the past three decades away from policies dominated
by political ideologies, anti-imperialism activities, support for armed
insurgencies, and export of Maoism.1 2 Today, China's policies have
"a more pragmatic orientation that place[s] priority on raising the
living standards of the Chinese people and building up China's
3
comprehensive national power through economic development.""11
As a result of these policy priorities, China kept a rather low
profile in the WTO, regardless of whether the issue concerned
intellectual property protection or dumping. As Professor Gao
observes, "[b]e it in the informal green room meetings, the formal
meetings of the various committees and councils or the grand sessions
114
of the Ministerial Conferences, China has generally been reticent.
According to Professor Gao, keeping such a low profile in the WTO
could be beneficial to China, at least in the first few years of its
accession:
As a newly-acceded Member, China is required to undertake a lot
of commitments, many of which are more onerous than those of
existing WTO members. It is already a humongous challenge for
China to try to implement these commitments. After having been in
the spotlight for fifteen years, what China needs now is some quiet
breathing space. Shouldering a leadership role would put China
110

See China and the WTO, supra note 82, at 3.

111 SUTTER, supra note 109, at 53.

112 See David Shambaugh. Return to the Middle Kingdom? ChinaandAsia in the Early
Twenty-First Century [hereinafter Shambaugh, Return to the Middle Kingdom?], in
POWER SHIFT: CHINA AND ASIA'S NEW DYNAMICS 23, 24 (David Shambaugh ed., 2005)
[hereinafter POWER SHIFT].
113 C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD
NEEDS TO KNOW NOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER
BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET].

120 (2006) [hereinafter

114 Henry S. Gao, China'sParticipationin the WTO: A Lawyer's Perspective, 11 SING.
Y.B. INT'L L. 41, 69 (2007) [hereinafter Gao. China's Participationin the WTO]; accord
Pearson, supra note 85, at 242 ("Beijing is in no great hurry to take on a central leadership
role in the WTO. despite willingness to posture on some issues.") Qin. supra note 84, at
188 ("Although China ...has voiced its support for the developing country members on
most of the issues, it has shunned taking any leadership role.").
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back on the front stage again and encourage other Members to
pressure China to make more concessions.
Second, China was cognizant of the need to cultivate goodwill
among its neighbors and to respond to concerns about the security and
16
economic threats that had emerged as a result of its rise in power.'
From developing concepts such as "peaceful rise" (hepingjueqi)and
"peace and development,"'' to the emphasis on the need to develop a
harmonious, multipolar world," 8 to the establishment of "early
harvest programs" in bilateral and regional trade agreements to
benefit less powerful neighbors, 119 Chinese leaders were eager to
"reassure the world that [China would] pursue a different
development path than did Germany and Japan in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries-a path based not on aggressive
changes to the international
order, but instead on benevolent
120
principles of mutual benefit.,
To a great extent, the active development of the "benevolent
power" image by the present Chinese leadership reminds one of Deng
Xiaoping's plea for practicing self-restraint in the early 1990s. As he
reportedly said after the Tiananmen incident: "[W]atch and analyze
developments calmly; secure our own positions; deal with change
with confidence; conceal our capacities;
be good at keeping a low
121
profile; never become the leader.,
115 Gao, China'sParticipationin the WTO, supra note 114, at 70.
116 For discussions of the so-called China threat, see generally CHINA'S FUTURE:
CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNER OR EMERGING THREAT (Ted Galen Carpenter & James A. Dom
eds., 2000): BILL GERTz, THE CHINA THREAT: HOW THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC TARGETS
AMERICA (2000); STEVEN M. MOSHER, HEGEMON: CHINA'S PLAN TO DOMINATE ASIA
AND THE WORLD (2000); PETER NAVARRO, THE COMING CHINA WARS: WHERE THEY
WILL BE FOUGHT AND How THEY CAN BE WON (2007).
117Kurt M. Campbell, Forewordto CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: BEIJING'S
STRATEGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ix, x (Joshua Eisenman et al. eds., 2007)

[hereinafter

CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD].
118 See BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET. supra note 113. at 129: KISSINGER.

supra note 34. at 500.
119 See Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 996-97,
1007 08 (2011).
120 BERGSTEN ET AL.,

THE BALANCE SHEET. supra note 113, at 121; see also

Shambaugh, Return to the Middle Kingdom?. supra note 112, at 29-41 (discussing factors
affecting Beijing's new proactive diplomacy around its periphery). See generally STEVE
CHAN, CHINA. THE US AND THE POWER-TRANSITION THEORY: A CRITIQUE (2008)

(explaining why China is unlikely to provoke the United States despite its rising power).
121Teng Chung-chian, Hegemony or Partnership: China's Strategy and Diplomacy
Toward Latin America, in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 117, at 84,
88 ("[W]atch and analyze developments calmly [leng/ing guancha]; secure our own
positions [chenzhuo yingfiu]; deal with change with confidence [wenzhu zhenjiao]; conceal
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Like Deng, Chinese leaders have stated frequently and explicitly
that China is not interested in achieving "regional hegemony or
international leadership (except perhaps in the context of promoting
the interests of the developing world). ' '122 According to Wen Jiabao,
the current Chinese premier, China is more correctly seen as "a
friendly elephant' 123 (youhao de daxiang)-a well-crafted image that
is appropriate for a "status quo power" that poses no threat to its
neighbors despite its enormous size. 24 It is therefore, no surprise that
China was somewhat reluctant to develop a higher profile in the
international intellectual property regime.
Third, while China was undergoing rapid economic transformation,
it experienced corresponding transformation in the political arena.
The political makeup of China's top leadership today is somewhat
different from what it was during the country's formative years. At
that time, Mao Zedong and, later, Deng Xiaoping were China's
paramount leaders; the decision-making process was highly
centralized.
By the time the third- and fourth-generation leadership emergedwith Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao at the helm, respectively-the
decision-making process had become more decentralized. As a result,
leaders could not ignore the political implications of their policies.
our capacities [taoguangyanghui]; be good at keeping a low profile [shanyu shouzhuo];
never become the leader [iuebu dantou]."). In the context of China's foreign policy, the
oft-misinterpreted phrase "taoguang yanghui" has been particularly controversial. See
Verna Yu, "China Threat" Hangs on a Phrase, S. CHINA MORNING POST. Oct. 2. 2010. at
4.
122 BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 113, at 121; see also William

W. Keller & Thomas G. Rawski, Asia's Shifting Strategic and Economic Landscape, in
CHINA'S RISE AND THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE IN ASIA 3. 6 (William W. Keller &

Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2007) ("Some may suggest that China's policy of economic
engagement and commercial diplomacy in Asia is merely tactical, a 'charm offensive'
designed to buy time until China is economically and militarily powerful enough to exert
regional hegemony."); Robert I. Rotberg, China's Questfor Resources, Opportunitiesand
Influence in Africa, in CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE. AID, AND INFLUENCE 1, 2 (Robert 1.
Rotberg ed.. 2008) [hereinafter CHINA INTO AFRICA] ("Despite what Washington may
believe, China is not using its engagement with Africa primarily to humble the United
States or Europe, or to score political points in the ongoing battle for global hegemony.")
Xiang Lanxin. An Alternative Chinese View, in CHINA'S EXPANSION INTO THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE: IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES 44, 44
(Riordan Roett & Guadalupe Paz eds., 2008) ("[I]n Washington there is a growing
suspicion that China has a well-thought-out design or grand strategy to undermine the
traditional U.S. dominance in [Latin America]. In reality, however, China has yet to define
the nature of its relationship with [the region].").
123 DAVID C. KANG, CHINA RISING: PEACE, POWER, AND ORDER IN EAST ASIA 131
(2007).
124 Id. at 80.

2011]

The Middle Kingdom and the IP World

While intellectual property protection was undoubtedly important to
the country's economic growth, the leaders cautiously avoided actions
that would be viewed by their
opponents or the larger public as
125
kowtows to foreign interests.
Their cautious approach was understandable. Toward the end of
President Jiang's leadership, for example, he and Premier Zhu Rongji
were heavily criticized for their friendly policies toward the United
States.126 If Jiang and Zhu could be criticized by fellow leaders, one
could only imagine how much more difficult it would be for the next
generation of leaders to make decisions.
Thus, when the fourth-generation leaders assumed key positions
following the Sixteenth National Party Congress in November 2002,
less than a year after China's WTO accession,' 21 this group of new
and young leaders were unsurprisingly wary of their participation in
the international intellectual property debate-or, for that matter, the
discussion of any international matters. After all, reformist leaders
needed to consolidate power first before they could make bold moves
in the international arena, which could draw severe criticism from
their more conservative counterparts.128
125As Margaret Pearson observes:
[T]he domestic political backlash to WTO accession and the political need for
leaders to respond to the idea that China had been "sold out" by the stringent
concessions to which its negotiators agreed are significant for China's behavior in
WTO. After accession, it became de rigueur in China to indicate that the country
would not just incur obligations from WTO membership but also would "gain
rights and benefits." . . . [T]he need to respond to domestic criticism about China's
weakness in its WTO negotiations, the need to stand up to the United States in
particular, and the need to use the "rights" afforded China by membership are key
to many of the public position China has taken at the WTO.
Pearson, supra note 85, at 246.
126 See, e.g., Doyle McManus, Report Sharpens Edginess with China, L.A. TIMES, May
26, 1999, at A18 (reporting that "[a]fter the bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade,
many Chinese criticized [Premier] Zhu [Rongji] and President Jiang Zemin who have
staked their foreign policy agenda on building a 'strategic partnership' with the United
States-for cozying up to a country that they believe is eager to keep China down").
127As Henry Kissinger points out, the fourth-generation leadership "represented the
first generation of top officials without personal experience of the revolution, the first
leaders in the Communist period to take office through constitutional processes-and the
first to assume positions of national responsibility in a China unambiguously emerging as
a great power." KISSINGER, supra note 34, at 488. For in-depth discussions of the fourthgeneration leadership, see generally CHINA'S NEW RULERS: THE SECRET FILES (Bruce

Gilley & Andrew Nathan eds., 2d ed. 2003): Li CHENG, CHINA'S LEADERS (2001); THE
NEW CHINESE LEADERSHIP: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES AFTER THE 16TH PARTY

CONGRESS (Yun-han Chu et al. eds., 2004).
128 See Lee H. Hamilton, Introduction to BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND

AMERICAN INTERESTS 1, 7 (James R. Lilley & Wendell Lewis Willkie eds., 1994) ("[1]f
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Fourth, when China joined the WTO, it made significant
concessions in its accession agreements with the European Union, the
United States, and other WTO member states. As a result, many of
the obligations China assumed under those accession agreements are
WTO-plus.1 9 In the intellectual property arena, for example, China
was required to comply with the TRIPS Agreement from the
inception of its membership, even though other middle-income
countries, such as Brazil and India, benefited from the transitional
period. 30 Taking full advantage of that period, India did not offer
patent protection for pharmaceutical products until 2005, four years
after China's accession. 13 These WTO-plus commitments therefore
rendered China's position closer to that of the developed world,
notwithstanding the fact that the country continued to identify itself as
"the world's largest developing country" and accrued32 strategic
benefits by playing a leading role in the developing world.
Fifth, the Chinese economy is highly complex, and developments
have been highly uneven-both geographically and across economic
and technological sectors.1 33 As I have noted, such developments have

Deng Xiaoping should die in the near future, there is some question whether his successors
will be willing or able to take on tough policy issues while they jockey for political
position.... It took Deng Xiao-ping over two years to achieve a dominant position after
the death of Mao Zedong."); Chinaand the WTO, supra note 82, at 14 (remarks of Jerome
Cohen, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law) ("[I]t is only when
somebody achieves power at the top of the Chinese system that he may be free to say
things that he did not feel he could say as number five, or four, or three, or two."): see also
id. at 4 (remarks of the Author) ("[R]ecent retirement of third-generation Chinese leaders,
including Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, and Li Peng ....
could spark an internal battle over
leadership succession."): Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute. supra note 10, at 1107 ("In
China, the reformists are constantly challenged by their more conservative counterparts.
who are uncomfortable with the country's rapid socio-economic changes and the resulting
social ills.").
129 See sources cited supra note 84.
130 See TRIPS Agreement art. 65(2).
131 See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 107, at 863.
132 BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 113, at 129.
133 As I observed earlier:
Although the subsequent founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949
helped centralize the country to a certain extent, strategic planning in the country's
formative years and the rapid economic development in China within the past two
decades have led to greater economic development in certain parts of China at the
expense of others. In Deng Xiaoping's words. "some people have to get rich first."
As a result, there are now enormous disparities across the country in the levels of
wealth and income, the purchasing power of local consumers, and the stages of
economic and technological development.
Peter K. Yu. Three Questions that Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China Intellectual
Property Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTEL. PROP. L. 412, 421 22 (2008) (footnotes
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resulted in the country's taking a somewhat "schizophrenic" position
in the international intellectual property arena. 34 While China prefers
to have stronger protection of intellectual property rights in
entertainment, software, semiconductors, and selected areas of
biotechnology, it remains reluctant to increase protection for
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilizers, seeds, and foodstuffs. Such
preferences were the combined result of a huge population, the
country's continued economic dependence on agriculture, the leaders'
worries about public health issues, and the general concerns about the
people's overall well-being.1 35 As a result of its "schizophrenic"
preferences, China is likely to be on the side of the developing world
with respect to some issues, but on the side of the developed world
with respect to others.
In fact, the complex internal economic conditions have made it
difficult for China to develop an effective national strategy. After all,
strategies that work for major cities, like Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou, may not work for the countryside.1 36 Likewise, strategies
that work for the prosperous coastal areas may not work for the poor
rural west. Indeed, one of the biggest challenges for China is to come
up with solutions that respond well to the country's complex and
divergent conditions and varying research and development
capabilities.
To complicate matters even further, rapid globalization and the
increasing activities taken by the private sector, sub-state actors, and
individuals have resulted in developments that include limited or no
state action. 137 As Chris Alden points out, sub-state actors in China,
omitted). See generally Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 55, at 203 13 (discussing the wide
regional and sectoral disparities in China).
134 See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 25 26 (explaining why intellectual
property developments in China should not be analyzed as if the country were
homogeneous).
135 See id. at 26.

136See Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 74, at 963 ("[O]ne needs to
recognize China as a 'country of countries.' rather than a homogenous one.").
137See David Shambaugh, Introduction: The Rise of China and Asia's New Dynamics.
in POWER SHIFT, supra note 112, at 1, 16 (noting in a model where its "core actor ...

is

not the nation-state but a plethora of nonstate actors and processes many of which are
difficult to measure with any precision-that operate at the societal level"). As one
commentator observes:
[A]fter two decades of reform in China, of decentralisation and privatisation.
Chinese strategies and presence in Africa are more of a mix of government
initiatives and the endeavours of private enterprises and individuals. The ability of
the Chinese government to regulate its enterprises and citizens aboard is limited,
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such as provincial governments and municipal authorities, have
undertaken major initiatives to establish formal and informal ties in
South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Angola,
and Nigeria. 13 It is also not uncommon to find friendship agreements
or sister-city relationships between cities and provinces in China and
other parts of the world,1 39 not to mention the large number of
Chinese tourists and students who help boost their country's visibility
while establishing ties at the sub-state level.14 0 The country's national
strategy, therefore, is more complex than one would expect from a
government that many have viewed simplistically as monolithic.
Finally, China joined the WTO at a time when the country had yet
to take a more assertive role in international regimes and multilateral
organizations. Although China reestablished trade and diplomatic ties
with the outside world more than three decades ago, it initially
harbored a strong mistrust toward multilateral organizations. In fact it
did not actively participate in multilateral organizations until the midto-late 1990s. 4 As Derek Mitchell describes:
especially in this era of neoliberal globalisation. Therefore, it is important to
appreciate that China is a heterogeneous grouping of various collective actors, i.e..
the government, state enterprises, private enterprises and the public in general, and
that the interests among the various actors within each sector might well differ.
Luk Tak Chuen, Regulating China? Regulating Globalisation?,in CHINA'S NEW ROLE IN
AFRICA AND THE SOUTH: A SEARCH FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE 13. 14 (Dorothy-Grace
Guerrero & Firoze Manji eds., 2008).
138See CHRIS ALDEN, CHINA IN AFRICA: PARTNER, COMPETITOR OR HEGEMON? 29

(2007).
139 See, e.g.,
DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE (AUSTL.), ACT'S TRADE WITH
CHINA 1 (2008), available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/china states.pdf; DEPT.
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE (AUSTL.), NORTHERN TERRITORY'S TRADE WITH CHINA

2 (2008), available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/china states.pdf; DEPT. OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE (AUSTL.), NSW'S TRADE WITH CHINA 2 (2008), available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/china states.pdf; DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS &
TRADE (AUSTL.), QUEENSLAND'S TRADE WITH CHINA 2 (2008). available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/china states.pdf; DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS &
TRADE (AUSTL.), TASMANIA'S TRADE WITH CHINA 2 (2008), available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fia/china states.pdf: DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS &
TRADE (AUSTL.), VICTORIA'S TRADE WITH CHINA 2 (2008), available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/china states.pdf; DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS &
TRADE (AUSTL.), WESTERN AUSTRALIA'S TRADE WITH CHINA 2 (2008), available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/ftachina states.pdf.
140See Eric Heginbotham, EvaluatingChina's Strategy Toward the Developing World,
in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 117. at 189, 202.
141 See id. at 189; see also BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA'S RISE. supranote 86, at 223 ("As
China has begun to think and act globally, it has had to adapt to an international system
traditionally dominated and developed by the major Western powers. China is generally
comfortable with the world's major international institutions such as the United Nations
and the World trade Organization ....With a professed commitment to international law,
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Previously, China had been suspicious of multilateral structures that
could potentially constrain Beijing's sovereignty and independent
action, but its perspective changed as Beijing became reassured of

its ability to safeguard its sovereign interests in multilateral
environments, and it gradually came to appreciate the international
system's benefits in addressing transnational challenges such as
piracy, drug trafficking, terrorism, and infectious disease. China

further recognized the value of being at the table to shape the rules,
rather than having the rules imposed upon it. Today, China is a
member of more than 130 inter-governmental organizations,
and
42

has signed more than 250 international multilateral treaties.

As China takes on a greater leadership role in the international
community, it has become more adept at and confident in handling
international affairs through the multilateral process.143 Its
participation in international organizations also increases as a result.
III
PHASE 2: TAKER AND SHAKER

A. China as a Norm Shaker
In Phase 2, China continues to serve as a norm taker, similar to
Phase 1. Nevertheless, the country also adds the new role of a norm
shaker, seeking to test the boundaries and limits of international
intellectual property norms. Having assumed this new role, China has
become more actively involved in regime development while being

equality of states, and democratization of international affairs, and eager to reassure the
world of its responsible conduct and peaceful rise, China views these institutions as
helpful in promoting its strategic goals and principles.") Lawrence Freedman, China as a
Global Strategic Actor, in DOES CHINA MATTER?. supra note 84, at 21, 22 ("[U]ntil
comparatively recently, [China] has shown disinterest and often distrust in international
treaties and the principles of multilateralism. fearing them as means by which it could be
put on the spot. Over time, as its interests began to coincide more with those of its
neighbours, or at least as it began to assert this to be the case, China began to understand
how international organizations could be used to protect interests and put pressure on
others. As a result it became more willing to sign up to international treaties and
agreements....").
142 BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 113, at 139-40. For booklength discussions of China's participation in international organizations, see generally
GERALD CHAN, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PARTICIPATION IN NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1971 (1989); CHINA JOINS THE WORLD, supra
note 32: HAROLD K. JACOBSON & MICHEL OKSENBERG, CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE
IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND GATT: TOWARD A GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1990).
143See Zhang Yunling & Tang Shiping, China's Regional Strategy, in POWER SHIFT,
supra note 112, at 48. 59 ("Today. we can perhaps argue that China has largely completed
its painful search for a national identity, thus becoming more confident of its relationships
and its position in the region.").
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more eager to explore its interests at both the multilateral and
nonmultilateral levels.
Within the WTO dispute settlement process, China often sat on the
side of the respondent; it has yet to use the process aggressively.
Since 2003, however, "China started to participate in almost all WTO
cases as a third party."' 144 While participation in this process is costly
and time-consuming, it has enabled China to play a much better
"WTO game."'15 The knowledge it acquired has come in handy when
a complaint was filed against China, as in China Measures Affecting
1 46
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights.
Such knowledge has also become more useful as China becomes
more active in filing complaints against other WTO member states.
Unlike other trade areas, in the intellectual property area China's
participation in the Doha Round was rather limited.1 47 The only major
document it advanced at the WTO was the November 2006
14
submission to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. 1
Highlighting the problematic overlap between patent protection and
the development of standards, the submission declared: "[I]ncluding
IPR into standards may have serious impact on the international
standards setting efforts and the corresponding implementations. As
TBT Agreement aims at boosting production efficiency and
facilitating international trade by encouraging the adoption of

144 Gao, China'sParticipationin the WTO, supra note 114, at 73.
145 See Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, supra note 10. at 1107-08 ("in addition to
human resources, litigation capital, and legal capacities, a successful player will need more
finely-honed skills and a deeper knowledge of the different facets of this game. The more
a country plays the WTO game, the more familiar and better it will become.") see also
Qin, supra note 84, at 193 94 (noting that "Chinese trade lawyers . . . through
representing China as a third party in scores of other WTO disputes, have gained much
knowledge and experience in the WTO adjudication system.").
146Request for Consultations by the United States. China Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual PropertyRights, WT/DS362/I (Apr. 16, 2007)
[hereinafter WTO Complaint]; see also discussion infra text accompanying notes 156-67.
For detailed analyses of this dispute. see generally Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute.
supra note 10; Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U.
1NT'L L. REV. 727 (2011).

147See Qin, supra note 84. at 188 & n.94 (noting that China has submitted more than
thirty proposals and position papers as part of the Doha Round negotiations).
148Communication from the People's Republic of China, Intellectual Property Right
(IPR) Issues in Standardization,G/TBT/W/251/Add.1 (Nov. 9. 2006) [hereinafter TBT
Committee Submission]. For media reports on the submission, see generally China Seeks
Dialogue on Link Between Standards, IPR in WTO, INSIDE US-CHINA TRADE, Nov. 15,
2006, William New, China Leads Developing Country Push for Balance in 1P and
Standards, 1NTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 24. 2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog
/index.php?p=599.
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international standards, such objectives can be frustrated and
therefore international trade retarded."'4 9 China further "propose[d]
that international standard setting bodies, as well as Members,
provide the Committee with relevant information regarding practices
and experience on their IPR policies in standardization for Members'
understanding and reference.,, 150 Although this submission was not as
high-profile as, say, a proposal before the TRIPS Council, the
submission suggests China's growing interest in shaping, or shaking,
international intellectual property norms.
Earlier that year, China also joined a group of developing countries
in cosponsoring a proposal to introduce a new Article 29bis into the
TRIPS Agreement. 15 1 The amended provision sought to create an
obligation to disclose in patent applications the source of origin of the
152
biological resources and traditional knowledge used in inventions.

Although the United States and Japan remain in strong opposition to
this disclosure approach, 153 the proposal has received wide support
from a large number of developing countries.1 54 The proposal is also
consistent with Article 26 of the recently amended Chinese Patent
Law, which requires patent applicants to disclose the traditional
knowledge and genetic resources used in their inventions. 155
In April 2007, the United States filed its first TRIPS complaint
against China over the lack of protection and enforcement of

149 TBTCommittee Submission, supra note 148,

13.
Id. 21.
151 See Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, India, Pakistan. Peru.
Thailand, and Tanzania, Doha Work Programme The OutstandingImplementation Issue
on the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological
Diversity, WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 (July 5. 2006) [hereinafter Article 29his Proposal].
152 See id.
2 (requiring patent applicants to "disclose the country providing the
resources and/or associated traditional knowledge, from whom in the providing country
they were obtained, and, as known after reasonable inquiry, the country of origin").
153 See Emanuela Arezzo, Struggling Around the "Natural" Divide: The Protection of
Tangible and Intangible Indigenous Property, 25 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 388
(2007). See generally JOSHUA D. SARNOFF & CARLOS M. CORREA, ANALYSIS OF
150

OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING DISCLOSURE OF ORIGIN REQUIREMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY APPLICATIONS (2006), U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2004/14, available at

http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcted2005l4 en.pdf (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of the introduction of a disclosure requirement).
154 William New, WTO Biodiversity Amendment Backed; EU Seeks 'New Thinking' on
GIs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index
.php?p=802.
155 Patent Law of the People's Republic of China art. 26 (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 12. 1984, amended Dec. 27. 2008. effective Oct. 1,
2009) [hereinafter Amended Patent Law].
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intellectual property rights. 56 Developed over more than two years,
the complaint focused on the following issues: (1) the high thresholds
for criminal procedures and penalties in the intellectual property area;
(2) the failure of the Chinese customs authorities to properly dispose
of infringing goods seized at the border; (3) the denial of copyright
protection to works that have not been authorized for publication or
dissemination within China; and (4) the unavailability of criminal
procedures and penalties for infringing activities that involved either
reproduction or distribution, but not both. 158 By the time the WTO
panel was established 159to address the complaint, the last claim had
already been resolved.
Although China's respondent role in this dispute did not provide
much room for "shaking" international intellectual property norms, it
admirably defended its position before the WTO and succeeded in
defeating half of the claims brought by the United States.
More
importantly, even though the panel ultimately found its laws
inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement, China was able to score
some important points that have the potential for influencing the
future interpretation and implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.161
For example, the panel report underscores both the importance of
having minimum standards and flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement
and the longstanding treatment of intellectual property rights as
private rights. 16 2 It also rejects the use of bilateral, plurilateral, or
regional trade agreements to divine meaning in the TRIPS
language. 63 In addition, the panel shows its appreciation of the
divergent local market conditions in each WTO member while
continuing the use of an evidence-based approach for resolving WTO

156

WTO Complaint, supra note 146.

157 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners 11, supra note 74, at 904-05 (noting that trade

groups have begun urging the USTR to file a WTO complaint against China concerning
inadequate intellectual property protection since February 2005).
158 See WTO Complaint, supra note 146.
159 See Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute. supra note 10, at 1055.
160 See Panel Report, supra note 9, 8.1.
161 See Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, supra note 146, at 744-81
(identifying six areas in which the WTO panel report has enabled developing countries to
score some important points in the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement).
162 See id. at 744-54 (discussing the panel's emphasis on the importance of the TRIPS
minimum standards and on the Agreement's recognition that "intellectual property rights
are private rights").
163 See id. at 754-57 (discussing the panel's refusal to treat subsequently-negotiated
U.S. free trade agreements as subsequent agreements within the meaning of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties).
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disputes. 164 The panel's discussion of Article 41.5 also hints at its
willingness to consider evidence in cases where resource demands in
the area of intellectual property enforcement have exceeded those in
other areas of law enforcement. 165 Compared with India Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products,166 the first TRIPS dispute between a developed country and
a developing country, the U.S.-China dispute demonstrates the
significant progress China and its developing country supporters have

made. 161
A year after the release of this panel decision, China joined India in
registering concerns about the development of TRIPS-plus
enforcement standards at the June 2010 TRIPS Council meeting.
Their timely interventions were made largely in response to the
release of the draft text of the highly controversial AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement 168 (ACTA) and in view of concerns
over the ongoing, disturbing development of bilateral, plurilateral,
and regional trade agreements. 69 As China explained, the TRIPS-plus
enforcement standards could cause a wide variety of systemic
problems within the international trading system. 70 For instance, the
higher standards could spark potential legal conflicts with the TRIPS
Agreement as well as with other WTO agreements.1 71 By increasing
the complexity of intellectual property standards, they could also
164 See id. at 757 63 (discussing the panel's appreciation of local conditions and its
demands for substantive, as opposed to anecdotal, evidence).
165 See id. at 778-81 (discussing the panel's interpretation of Article 41.5 of the TRIPS
Agreement).
166 Panel Report, India Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997); Panel Report, India Patent Protection
for PharmaceuticalandAgriculturalChemical Products, WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24. 1998).
167 In this dispute. developing countries have played a much larger role. Argentina,
Brazil, India, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey all participated in the panel proceedings as
third parties. Panel Report, supra note 9, 1.6. Except for India and Turkey, all of these
countries also either provided a written submission to or made an oral statement before the
WTO panel.
168 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011
[hereinafter ACTA]. available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011 /may/tradoc
_147937.pdf. ACTA is a plurilateral agreement that seeks to set a new and higher
benchmark for intellectual property enforcement among like-minded countries. See
generally Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (andNow Open) Fears ofACTA. 64 SMU L. REv. 975
(2011) (discussing the serious concerns about ACTA).
169 See TRIPS Council, Minutes of Meeting
250, 264, IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010)
[hereinafter TRIPS Council, Minutes].
170 See id.

1 248-63. China's June 9 statement was reprinted as The Problems with the

"TRIPS plus" Enforcement Trend: China's View, S. BULL., July 28, 2010, at 13.
171 See TRIPS Council, Minutes, supra note 169,
252 53.
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make the international legal framework highly unpredictable, thereby
posing barriers to legitimate trade.' 2
Moreover, the TRIPS-plus standards may upset the delicate
balance struck in the TRIPS Agreement through an arduous multiyear
negotiation process. 173 The standards could also build harmful
technological barriers while raising concerns about resource
misallocation,1 74 an issue previously
raised in the recent U.S.-China
15
7
dispute.
enforcement
TRIPS
To conclude its intervention, China advanced a proposal on
specific safeguard principles against the ongoing push for TRIPS-plus
enforcement standards. 176 These principles included:
(i) the [intellectual property] chapter or provisions of [a regional
trade agreement, free trade agreement] or regional agreement to
which a WTO Member was party shall not be inconsistent with the
TRIPS Agreement of WTO; (ii) the enforcement of IPRs shall not
create distortive effects on legitimate international trade; and (iii) no
WTO Member shall be restrained77from the autonomy for utilizing
its public enforcement resources.
Outside the WTO, China has had active participation in WIPO. 17In
addition to those treaties China joined in the 1980s and 1990s,
China is now a member of the Singapore Treaty on the Law of
Trademarks (Singapore Treaty), the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (See Table 1). The latter
two treaties were key concerns of the United States and its intellectual
property rights holders. As the USTR stated in the 2005 National
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, "[t]he United
States considers the WIPO treaties to reflect many key international
norms for providing copyright protection over the Internet,... [and]
China's accession to the WIPO
treaties is an increasingly important
179
priority for the United States."'

172 See id. 254.
173See id. 255.
174 See id. 1 256-58.
175 See Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries. supra note 146. at 727.
778 81 (discussing China's arguments in relation to Article 41.5 of the TRIPS
Agreement).
176 See TRIPS Council. Minutes, supra note 169. 259.
177 Id.

178 See discussion supra Part I.
179 2005 NTE REPORT, supra note 2, at 96.

20111

The Middle Kingdom and the IP World

China has also been active in hosting intergovernmental
conferences for WIPO, at both the international and regional levels. 80
The International Symposium on Geographical Indications in Beijing
in June 2007 provides a good example.181 In addition, China for the
first time obtained a senior leadership position within WIPO. In
December 2006, Wang Binying, who joined the WIPO Bureau for
Development Cooperation for Asia and the Pacific in 1992 as a senior
program officer, became the first Chinese national to serve as the
organization's assistant director general. 1 2 Three years later, she was
promoted to the deputy director general position, taking charge of
matters related
to trademarks, industrial designs, and geographical
1 83
indications.

At the nonmultilateral level, the State Intellectual Property Office
(SIPO) has also been quite active in developing professional ties with
patent offices from around the world. In 2007, for example, SIPO
officials met with their counterparts from the European Patent Office,
the Japanese Patent Office, the Korean Intellectual Property Office,
and the United States Patent and Trademark Office to discuss ways to
"improv[e] the efficiency of their examination systems and to
harmonize their office systems.'

84

These so-called "1P5" discussions

further strengthened SIPO's status as "a player in the top tier of patent
offices that will85dominate the emerging system of global patent
administration."

180 See Search Meetings and Documents, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en
/archive meeting.jsp (last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (select "China" in the "Select Country"
drop-down menu and perform a search) (providing a list of WIPO meetings held in
China); see also Pearson, supra note 85, at 257 ("Chinese attempts at leadership are
primarily exhibited as a desire to host major meetings, such as they will do for the
Olympics in 2008.").
1I See Conferences, Meetings and Seminars, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en
/details.jsp?meeting id=13243 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (providing information about
the International Symposium on Geographical Indications).
182Press Release, WIPO, Member States Approve Appointment of Top Management
Team (June 20, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/prdocs/2006
/wipo pr 2006 449.html.
183 Press Release, WIPO. Member States Endorse Senior Appointments (June 16.
2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2009/article0016.html.
184 PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES

AND THEIR CLIENTS 236 (2010).
185 Id. at 233: see also id. (noting that the Chinese Patent Office, and later SIPO, has
served as an international searching authority for PCT purposes since 1994).
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8 6
Taking the lead from the United States and the European Union,'
China further established bilateral trade agreements with Chile,
Pakistan, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, and Costa Rica.'
Additional agreements with Australia, the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Gulf Cooperation
Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates), Iceland, South Africa, and the South Africa
Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and
Swaziland) are under discussion.18 8
In addition, China established a set of regional agreements with
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), s9
including a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the
intellectual property field. 190 China is also exploring greater economic
cooperation with India, with the hope of eventually developing a
regional trade agreement. 191 If such developments continue, China
may be able to greatly strengthen its collaboration on intellectual
property matters within Asia. Together with India and ASEAN, China
may even be able to develop a "normative community" that has
enough 92political clout to rival the United States or the European
Union. 1

186 See generallyFREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES (Jeffrey
J. Schott ed., 2004) (providing an excellent collection of articles discussing U.S. free trade
agreements).
187 See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements. supra note 119. at 957-58.
188 See id. at 958.

189 Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Co-operation Between China and ASEAN, ASEAN-China, Aug. 15, 2009,
available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/inforimages/200908/20090817113007764.pdf;
Agreement on Trade in Services of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Co-operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the
People's Republic of China, ASEAN-China, Jan. 14, 2007. available at http://www.asean
.org/19346.htm; Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and the People's Republic of China, ASEAN-China. Nov. 29, 2004, available at
http://www.asean.org/16646.htm Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Co-operation Between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China, ASEAN-China, Nov.
4. 2002, available at http://www.asean.org/13196.htm.
190 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat and the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of
China on Cooperation in the Field of Intellectual Property, ASEAN-China, Dec. 21, 2009,
available at http://www.asean.org/15thsunimit/Mou-China-lP-Eng.pdf.
191 Jim Yardley. IndianLeader in China Urges Closer Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16. 2008.
at A8.
192 See Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, supra note 27 (discussing the
potential for linking China. India, and ASEAN together as a single normative community
named Chindiasean); see also SIMON TAY, ASIA ALONE: THE DANGEROUS POST-CRISIS
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Although intellectual property remains a non-crucial item in
China's bilateral, plurilateral, and regional agreements and the
intellectual property provisions in these agreements differ
significantly,1 93 these agreements do include provisions showing
China's eagerness to shape intellectual property relationships with its
trading partners. The agreement with New Zealand, for example,
recognizes the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural
expressions, 194 thereby paving the way for greater support of both the
Article 29bis proposal, which China cosponsored, and the third and
recent amendments to the Chinese patent law. 195 The agreement with
Peru also includes an annex concerning the protection of twenty-two
geographical indications originating from China (See Table 2), an
intellectual property area that is just beginning to emerge in the
country.

DIVIDE FROM AMERICA 150 (2010) (advancing the concept of "Asia's normative
community").
193 As I wrote earlier:

In the intellectual property area, there are significant variations among the different
[sinic trade agreements]. The New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement
("NZCFTA") includes a lengthy chapter on intellectual property protection. By
contrast, the China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, which was signed after the
NZCFTA, does not mention intellectual property protection at all. Likewise,
although the Chile-China Free Trade Agreement mentions the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement on Public Health and identifies as an important goal the
prevention of abuse of intellectual property rights and restraints on competition, the
NZCFTA omits both issues.
Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 119, at 1011 (footnote omitted).
194 See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand and the
Government of the People's Republic of China art. 165, N.Z.-China, Apr. 7, 2008,
available
at
http://chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/2-Text-of-the-agreement/0
-downloads/NZ-ChinaFTA-Agreement-text.pdf ("Subject to each Party's international
obligations, the Parties may establish appropriate measures to protect genetic resources,
traditional knowledge and folklore.").
195 See Article 29bis Proposal. supra note 151; Amended Patent Law, supra note 155.
art. 26.
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TABLE

2. List of Chinese geographical indications included in the ChinaPeru Free Trade Agreement

1.

Anxi Tie Guanyin (Tieh-Kuan-Yin) Tea :5Z4VJIIq

2.

Shaoxing (Yellow) Wine

3.

Fuling Pickled Mustard Tuber -P[t#

4.

(Ningxia) Zhongning Matrimony Vine ( -'X)

5.

Jingdezhen Porcelain

6.

Zhenjiang Aromatic Vinegar 4A$TWAR

7.

Pu'er Tea _

8.

(Xihu) Longjing Tea (

9.

Kinghwa (Jinhua) Ham ±4-P)(U3

92NIL
t-3

*41,4AR- 1

-I*A

10. Shanxi Mature Vinegar
11. Xuanwei Ham _

) )t#,

W-tliAi

&,k)H

12. Longquan Celadon tAp13. Yixing Dark-red Enameled Pottery AY -MON [Q
14. Korla Fragrant Pear

Ft, 44

15. Min County Tang-Kuei (Chinese angelica root) IRR4 h9-9
16. Wenshan Notoginseng 5-

-

17. Wuchang Rice HVA*
18. Tongjiang White Fungus 3_$T4R]
19. Bama Miniature Pig )-*A
20. Taihe Blackbone Chicken A-I AA
21. Fuding Shaddock *h4
V *0
22. (Nanjing) Cloud-pattern Brocade (

)t7

Source: Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Peru, Annex 10,
China-Peru, Apr. 28, 2009, available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/annex
/bilu fujian1O en.pdf.

B. An EnhancedProfile
In Phase 1, China kept a rather low profile in the international
intellectual property regime. In Phase 2, however, China is slowly
adding the role of a norm shaker. This more assertive role is
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consistent with the Chinese leadership's growing awareness of the
economic and strategic importance of a well-functioning intellectual
property system. 196 Such growing awareness was indeed the impetus
behind the State Council's recent adoption of a pioneering National
Intellectual Property Strategy. 1 Adopted in June 2008, this new
strategy provides a comprehensive plan to improve the protection and
management of intellectual property rights. Of particular emphasis is
the active development of homegrown or self-driven intellectual
property (zizhu zhishi chanquan).198
Although this new strategy does not speak to China's role in the
international intellectual property regime, it is not hard to understand
why China needs to assume a more assertive role in that regime. First,
a greater focus on international norm-setting will help China fight off
external pressure from the European Union and the United States.
Every year, the USTR's Section 301 process subjects China to
heightened scrutiny. While the process focuses on questionable, selfreported data supplied by industry groups, 199 it is hard to ignore the
heavy pressure the process has placed on the Chinese government and
the harm the process's findings have inflicted on China's international
reputation. Because the WTO does not allow a member state to
pursue retaliatory actions until it has exhausted all of the remedies
permissible under its rules, 200 the Section 301 process is often used as
a "shaming" tool, except in relation to issues lying outside the scope
of the WTO, such as those found in TRIPS-plus trade and investment
agreements.20 '

196As President Hu Jintao remarked in the Group Study of the Political Bureau of the
Central Committee of CPC in May 2006: "Strengthening the building of China's system of
intellectual property right and vigorously upgrading the capacity of creation, management,
protection and application regarding intellectual property are our urgent need[s] for the
purpose of enhancing independent and self-driven innovation capabilities and building an
innovation-oriented country." Wu. supra note 85. at 120: see also Yu, From Pirates to
Partners,supra note 28, at 189 96 (discussing the need to convince Chinese leaders of the
benefits of intellectual property protection).
197 STATE COUNCIL, COMPENDIUM OF CHINA NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STRATEGY (2008).

198See id. 7; see also Wu, supra note 85, at 121 (discussing the importance of"selfdriven" intellectual property).
199 See Peter K. Yu,Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 7-8 (2010)
(questioning the accuracy and reliability of industry-supplied figures).
200 See Panel Report, United States Sections 301 310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS 152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
201See Vicki Allums, Special 301: TRIPS-Plus Alive and Kicking, 5 J. MARSHALL
REV. 1NTELL. PROP. L. 651 (2006) (discussing TRIPS-plus trade commitments in relation
to the Section 301 process).
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Moreover, as the recent WTO disputes between China and the
United States have shown, China is likely to continue to face pressure
from the United States through the WTO dispute settlement process.
Although China has a strong preference for consultation and
conciliation,20 2 the United States embraces a legalistic approach and
considers the WTO dispute settlement process a means to address
disagreement and ensure rule compliance. In fact, the recent dispute
on the lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights may
represent only the beginning of a series of complaints that the United
States (and its industries) intend to bring against China before the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
Second, China has significant internal needs, and a wellfunctioning intellectual property system may help the country meet
those needs.20 3 At the micro level, such a system will help provide the
incentives needed for indigenous industries to develop. Indeed, it is
no surprise that the new National Intellectual Property Strategy
focuses considerably on homegrown intellectual property. At the
202 Such preference is particularly clear in the first few years of China's membership.
As Julia Qin observes:

In the first several years after accession, China showed a clear preference for
handling trade conflicts through negotiation rather than WTO adjudication ...
China settled the first WTO complaint against it through consultations, even though
the legal issues involved were not clear-cut. When threatened with WTO litigation
on several occasions during this initial period, China had opted to compromise so
as to avoid formal WTO complaints.
Qin, supra note 84, at 192 (footnote omitted); cf. CHIU, supra note 30, at 75 76 (noting
that "Communist China consider[ed] "negotiation" the most appropriate method of settling
questions of treaty interpretation" in the early days of the People's Republic).
Nevertheless, China's "litigation avoidance" strategy began to change in 2006. See Qin,
supra note 84, at 193. Professor Qin attributed this change to two different reasons:
First of all, the significance of the Chinese interests involved in [the post-2005
cases] makes compromises less palatable. The several pending complaints against
China . . . challenge important aspects of the Chinese system, and the U.S.
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations in the Chinese paper case may
set a precedent that can potentially affect Chinese exports broadly. Second. it
appears that there has been a change of mentality among Chinese decision-makers.
In the past they were highly concerned about losing a WTO case, regarding the loss
of WTO litigation as a matter of political defeat. But over time the decision-makers
seem to have realized that China cannot always avoid WTO disputes through
political manoeuvres and that it needs to embrace WTO litigation as a normal way
of resolving disputes. Contributing to this change of mentality is the growing
confidence of Chinese trade lawyers who, through representing China as a third
party in scores of other WTO disputes, have gained much knowledge and
experience in the WTO adjudication system.
Id. at 193-94.
203 See Yu, China Puzzle. supra note 55, at 193-202 (discussing the development of
local intellectual property stakeholders and the shift toward an export-driven economy).
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macro level, a well-functioning intellectual property system can help
attract more foreign direct investment, which will be beneficial to the
local economy. 4 The growing investment, in turn, may lead to
greater transfer of technology and knowledge, creation of more local
jobs, accelerated development of human capital, and generation of
increased tax revenues. 205
Third, as the recent summit of the G-20 economies has shown,
China is now in a position to assume greater leadership in the
developing world.20 6 China is also playing increasingly important
roles in such international fora as WIPO and the WTO.20 7 Indeed, it
would be highly beneficial for China to develop a louder voice in
both the developing world and the international community*208 As
Peter Drahos cautions us, although Brazil and India historically have
taken leadership roles in the developing world in the intellectual
property arena, it is unclear whether they "are prepared to provide the
general leadership on intellectual property issues that they once
did., 20 9 If these countries fail to assume past leadership roles, China
will be presented with an unprecedented opportunity to become more
assertive at the international level. Even if China chooses not to
provide visible leadership for developing countries, it could still work
closely with Brazil and India to push for standards and policies that
would benefit the developing world.21 0

204 Commentators have widely noted the ambiguous relationship between intellectual
property protection and foreign direct investment. See id at 176-80 (providing a review of
economic literature documenting such a relationship). Nevertheless, China has strong
innovative capacity and more than a sufficiently large market. See id. at 180. It therefore
possesses the two key prerequisite conditions needed to support such a relationship.
205 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 28, at 192 93.
206 See Mark Landler & Stephen Castle, Chinese and Saudis Loom Large at Summit,
1NT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 15, 2008. at 1 (reporting about China's significant role in the
G 20 summit).
207 See Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Canctin and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 235
(2004) ("[T]he 'China factor' enabled the creation of the G-21 [now commonly referred to
as the G 20].... [W]ith China in their ranks, the size and impact of this coalition became
unprecedented.").
208 Cf. Pearson, supra note 85. at 251 ("The PRC government used the occasion of its
first major speech as a WTO member to declare it would serve as a 'bridge' between the
developed and developing worlds."); id at 254 ("Th[e] effort to cover both sides of the
developed-developing country agenda played out repeatedly throughout China's early
WTO tenure.").
209 Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property
Standard-Setting,5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765. 765 (2002).

210 See generally Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Coalitions for
Development,
in IMPLEMENTING
THE
WORLD
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
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Finally, a more assertive role in the international intellectual
property arena can help China develop international norms that
benefit the country in either its negotiation of future international
intellectual property treaties or its resolution of intellectual propertyrelated WTO disputes. International treaties are generally negotiated
in the shadow of existing international norms. 2 1 By developing
norms that are beneficial to local development, China will pave the
way for establishing international treaties that take account of local
conditions. The development of these norms may also affect the
interpretation of international treaties to which China is a partyeither in the form of subsequent developments or through the
development of customary international law. 212 By clarifying or
spelling out limits to the country's international obligations, a greater
role in international norm-setting activities would most certainly
benefit China.
IV

PHASE 3: TAKER,

SHAKER, AND MAKER

Phase 3 takes place when China assumes the additional role of a
norm maker. With respect to norms that already exist, it is unclear
when China will take on the new role of a norm maker, as opposed to
staying in its role of a norm shaker. After all, norm shaking and norm
making represent two sides of the same coin. A norm that has been

ORGANIZATION'S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 79 (Jeremy de Beer ed., 2009) [hereinafter

IMPLEMENTING WIPO's DEVELOPMENT AGENDA] (discussing how the development of
"intellectual property coalitions for development" can help less developed countries
strengthen their collective bargaining position, influence negotiation outcomes, and
promote effective and democratic decision-making in the international intellectual
property regime).
211 See Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, supra note 10, at 1109 ("In the shadow of
[the WTO] panel report [on China Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights], and the gains China has made in the criminal enforcement
area, the country will now have a better negotiating position vis-a-vis the United States in
future bilateral discussions.") see also Gregory Shaffer. Recognizing Public Goods in
WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459, 477 (2004) (discussing how
countries can negotiate trade rules "in the shadow of' the WTO dispute settlement
process); see also Christina L. Davis, Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing Field?
Lessons from the Experience of Peru and Vietnam, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 219, 220 (John S. Odell ed., 2006) (arguing that
"the use of legal adjudication allows developing countries to gain better outcomes in
negotiations with their powerful trade partners than they could in a bilateral negotiation
outside of the institution").

212 See Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L.
REV. 13, 56 (2006).
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shaken up and transformed will necessarily result in the making of a
new norm. Examples of when norm shaking and norm making may
overlap are the introduction of a requirement for the disclosure of
traditional knowledge and genetic resources, the strengthening of the
protection for geographical indications in areas that go beyond just
wines and spirits, and the adjustment of intellectual property
enforcement standards based on enforcement capabilities, resource
constraints, and local needs and conditions.21 3
When the implicated norms have not been made or fully
formalized, however, it is much easier to notice China's role as a
norm maker. After all, there is no need to shake up old norms before
new ones can be developed. If old norms are displaced, the
displacement usually does not stem from a direct conflict between old
and new norms in the same space. Rather, it takes place when the new
norms spill over into areas into which old norms are expanding.
Examples of areas in which new norms could be made are global
climate change, protection for alternative forms of innovation, models
that take into account the uneven economic and technological
developments in developing countries, and new norms addressing
abuse of rights and restraints on trade. 214
Given the murky distinction between norm shaking and norm
making, it may be rather hard to determine conclusively whether
Phase 3 has already begun. In fact, China could have a very long
Phase 2, making Phase 3 only a possibility in the remote future. 2 5 In
short, whether Phase 3 has already begun is a matter of interpretation.
Nevertheless, challenges in demarcating periods and eras abound. For
example, historians and social scientists have wondered whether a
century includes exactly 100 years.2 16 What is really important for our
purposes is not to pinpoint exactly when Phase 2 will end and when
Phase 3 will begin. Rather, we should think more about the role China
will play in this final phase.
As I have noted elsewhere, once China has reached a "crossover
point" where stronger protection is in its self-interest, it will demand

213 See Yu, Intellectual PropertyandAsian Values, supra note 27.
214 See id.

215 Thanks to Mark Wu for pointing this out.
216 See, e.g.. ERIC HOBSBAWM. THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD,

1914 1991, at ix (1996) (considering 1914 1991 as the "short twentieth century");
KISSINGER. supra note 34, at 502 (suggesting that "China's period of weakness and
underachievement-one might call it China's 'long nineteenth century'-was officially
drawn to a close" following the opening of the 2008 Beijing Olympics).
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stronger protection of intellectual property rights.2' Similar demands
have already been made by the United States and Japan, both of
which were once major pirating nations.
In the nineteenth century, the United States was heavily criticized
for its lack of protection of foreign authors, ranging from Charles
Dickens to Anthony Trollope to Gilbert and Sullivan. 2 18 Although the
United States did not join the Berne Convention until 1989,219 it had
greatly improved its protection of foreign authors since the late
nineteenth century, thanks to the emergence of a critical mass of local
authors.220 Today, the United States actively champions the cause for
greater protection of copyrighted works throughout the world.
Likewise, Japan was heavily criticized by the United States and
other developed countries for free riding on the efforts of foreign
inventors. 221 Japan and the United States were at the brink of a trade
war in the late 1970s and early 1980s.222 Notwithstanding these initial
missteps, the protection of intellectual property rights dramatically

217 Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 55, at 175 ("[H]istory suggests that China is now
simply following the economic development paths of Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan-or even Germany and the United States. It is only a matter of time
before China is converted from a pirating nation to a country that respects intellectual
property rights."); see also Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its
Undetermined Future, 1 W1PO J. 1, 10-15 (2009) [hereinafter Yu. Global Intellectual
Property Order] (discussing the existence of a "crossover point" where countries consider
it to be in their self-interest the move from a pirating nation to one that strongly respects
intellectual property rights).
218 See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 331. 342 (2003).
219 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). In the United States, the Berne
Convention entered into force on March 1, 1989.
220 See Yu. The Copyright Divide, supra note 218, at 344.
221 As Joseph Massey, the former Assistant USTR for Japan and China, writes:

Parts of Japan's 1PR regime played supporting roles in tilting the competitive
playing field, inducing or in some cases compelling the transfer to Japanese rivals
of key U.S. technologies. These included the government's mandated cap on
royalty payments, compulsory licensing policies, and patent procedures that
enabled Japanese firms to surround foreign rivals' core patents with peripheral
patents as a means to compel cross-licensing. The result was all too often to deny
the U.S. or other foreign firms the competitive advantage in the Japanese market
that they would otherwise enjoy based on their technology.
Massey, supra note 55, at 233.
222 See MICHAEL P. RYAN, PLAYING BY THE RULES: AMERICAN TRADE POWER AND

DIPLOMACY IN THE PACIFIC 16-17 (1995) (providing a list of Section 301 trade disputes
involving Japan from 1974 to 1989); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 24 (2001) (stating that Japan was

identified as a priority foreign country under the Super 301 process for providing
inadequate market access to U.S. goods and services).
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improved in Japan in the past three decades. During the Uruguay
Round, Japan was an indispensable ally of the United States and the
European Communities in pushing for the establishment of the TRIPS
Agreement. 223 A few years ago, Japan even proposed an anticounterfeiting treaty to provide a new and higher benchmark for the
enforcement of intellectual property rights. This agreement has
recently been adopted in the form of ACTA, with Japan serving as the
treaty depositary. 24
If China follows the precedents set by the United States and Japan,
its economic and technological conditions will eventually reach a
crossover point where the country considers it to be in its selfinterests to provide stronger protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights. Once China has reached that point, it will
not only offer stronger protection and enforcement within the country
but will also demand other countries to do the same-similar to the
European Union, the United States, and Japan. In fact, there is no
guarantee that China will want the same intellectual property regime
as the one enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement or other international
intellectual property treaties. 225 There is actually a very good chance
that China may want something quite different from what we have
today-"something that builds upon [its] historical traditions and
cultural backgrounds and that takes account of [its] drastically
different socio-economic conditions. 22 6
Consider, for example, the protection of copyrighted works in the
digital environment. Such protection, or the lack thereof, is of great
importance to China, a country with the world's largest Internet
227
population of 485 million users.
As its Internet population
continues to grow, the country will be able to exert more influence on
developments in Internet law and policy across the world. As I have
noted often, the important question about the Internet in China is not

223 See sources cited supra note 23.
224 See ACTA. supra note 168. art. 45.
225 See Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order,supra note 217, at 13.
226 Id: see also JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 142. at 129 (noting the "process
of mutual adjustment" in which China and international organizations allowed themselves
to be influenced by each other): Jackson, supra note 11, at 19 (noting the need to
understand "the impact of the accession of China on the WTO itself').
227 CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER, 28TH STATISTICAL SURVEY
REPORT ON THE INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 5 (2011)

[hereinafter CNNIC

SURVEY REPORT]. available at http://wwwl.cnnic.cn/download/2011 /cnnic28threport.pdf
(stating that China has an Internet population of more than 485 million in July 2011).
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only how the Internet will change China but also how China will
change the Internet. 2 8
Notwithstanding the growing importance of Internet-related
developments in China, the digital copyright norms it favors may be
quite different from those found in the United States or other
developed countries. To begin with, a substantial portion of Chinese
Internet users are school- or college-age students, 229 due in large part
to the country's late economic development and relative technological
backwardness. As the China Internet Network Information Center
officially reported, Internet users aged below thirty made up of close
to sixty percent of the total Internet population in July 2011 .23
Because any law and policy relating to the Internet is likely to have a
substantial impact on the future pillars of Chinese society, 23' the
stakes for Internet law reforms may be higher than those for other
type of intellectual property law reform.
Moreover, China continues to exert heavy control over the flow of
information within society. Indeed, the country has been widely used
as the poster child for Internet censorship, 232 even though such
censorship
occurs elsewhere, 3 3 including many developed
23
countries.
Ironically from the intellectual property standpoint, and

228 This is one of the main themes of the Annual Chinese Internet Research Conference
I cofounded in 2003.
229 See Wei Yanliang & Feng Xiaoqing, Comments on Cyber Copyright Disputes in the
People's Republic of China: Maintainingthe Status Quo While Expanding the Doctrine of
Profit-AMaking Purposes, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 149, 150 51 (2003) (discussing
how most online infringers in China are poor students).
230 CNNIC SURVEY REPORT, supra note 227. at 19.
231 See Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong,
48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693, 705 (2010) [hereinafter Yu, Digital Copyright Reform]
(discussing how criminalizing online file sharing can adversely impact "a large number of
individuals, including youngsters who are the future pillars of society").
232 See Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Internet Freedom, Address
Delivered at the Newseum in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010 01/21/intemet freedom?page full.
233 See ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING

155 65 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008) (examining Internet filtering in Asia); see id. at
240-44, 263-71. 286-99. 325-28, 338-59. 364-74. 390-94, 420-24 (documenting
Internet filtering in Afghanistan. China. India. Iran, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, North
Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam).
234 See Rebecca MacKinnon, The Green Dam Phenomenon, WALL ST. J. ASIA, June
18, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124525992051023961.html
("The Internet
censorship club is expanding and now includes a growing number of democracies.
Legislators are under growing pressure from family groups to 'do something' in the face
of all the threats sloshing around the Internet, and the risk of overstepping is high.");
Christopher Rhoads & Loretta Chao, Iran ' Web Spying Aided by Western Technology,
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disturbingly from the human rights standpoint, censorship regimes
may provide the much-needed infrastructure to strengthen
enforcement in the digital environment. China therefore may offer an
interesting alternative model that does not exist in Western
democracies, notwithstanding the fact that such a model may not sit
well with the free speech, free press, and privacy values in the latter
group of countries.235
Another example concerns the protection of alternative forms of
innovation. The existing intellectual property system, as enshrined in
the TRIPS Agreement and the Eurocentric Paris and Berne
Conventions, focuses primarily on path breaking creations and
innovations. However, sequential and cumulative innovations have
been the driver of economic growth in many developing countries.236
For example, utility models or petty patents remain an important
237
feature of the intellectual property systems in these countries.
As
Assafa Endeshaw describes:
[Within Asia, t]here are different approaches towards minor
inventions and their terms of protection as well as that for patents.
Thus Indonesia accords protection to small product improvements
WALL ST. J.. June 22, 2009. at Al (discussing Internet control in Britain, Germany. United
States, and Australia).
235 See Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1401 02 (2010)
(discussing how the graduated response system would undermine the protection of free
speech, free press, and privacy); Yu, Digital Copyright Reform, supra note 231. at 715
(discussing how the proposed disclosure and retention mechanism in Hong Kong's digital
copyright reform would chill speech).
236 See Hiroyuki Odagiri et al.. 1PR and the Catch-Up Process in Japan. in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP: AN INTERNATIONAL

COMPARATIVE STUDY 95, 126 (Hiroyuki Odagiri et al. eds., 2010) ("In indigenous sectors
with mostly tiny firms [in Japan]. many innovations occur in the form of practical devices
rather than pure inventions."); Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the TwentyFirst Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOuS. L. REV. 1115,
1124 (2009) (distinguishing between "cumulative and sequential innovation" and "pathbreaking innovation" and noting that "how to protect cumulative and sequential
innovation as distinct from path-breaking innovation becomes an ever more pressing
problem as more small-and medium-sized firms acquire a taste and capacity for such
innovation"); see also SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 127 59
(2004) (discussing sequential innovation and the need to protect cumulative innovators).
237 See, e.g.. Preston M. Torbert & Zhao Jia, People's Republic of China, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA 233, 238 (Alan S. Gutterman & Robert
Brown eds., 1997) (discussing utility models and designs in China); Jacinto D. Jimenez,
Philippines, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra, at 270 (discussing

designs and utility models in the Philippines)

Joon K. Park, South Korea,

in

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra, at 337, 337 (noting the adoption
of the Utility Model Act in South Korea); Michael F. Fedrick. Taiwan, in INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA. supra, at 389. 389-90 (discussing the utility model patent
protection in Taiwan).
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through a 'Simple Patent' (obviously a 'petty patent') for one time
of five years. Vietnam, on the other hand, grants protection for
'Utility Solutions' for six years. By contrast, Malaysia recognizes
'Utility Innovations' for a period of five years but renewable for a
further five. The Philippines recognizes design patents (which
include utility models) and protects them for five years, too, but
with a3Rossibility of renewals for two consecutive periods of five
years.
In its 2010 annual report, SIPO reported that China had received
5,433,189 applications from 2003 to 2010.239 Out of these
applications, utility models accounted for 1,650,389 applications,
about a third of the total applications. 24 0 The ratio between utility
models applied by the locals and those applied by foreigners is about
99:1.241

In recent years, a shanzhai culture has emerged in China, raising
challenging questions about the acceptable boundaries of sequential
and cumulative innovation. 242 While many intellectual property rights
holders and commentators consider the shanzhai phenomenon highly
undesirable, shanzhai products do offer some benefits, especially
when the products provide improvements that otherwise would not
occur. In a world where intellectual property rights holders are
sometimes reluctant to undertake innovation, shanzhai products may
provide the much-needed "work around" to further technological
developments. In addition, shanzhai products may provide an
efficient means for China to catch up with its more developed trading
partners. By enabling citizens to avoid paying monopoly prices, those
products may also allow the Chinese to appropriate the consumers'
surplus.2 43

238 ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIAN EMERGING ECONOMIES

73 (2010).
239 STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE (CHINA), 2010 S1PO ANNUAL REPORT 90

(2010), available at http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/arnualreports/2010/.
240 Id
241

Id

242 "Originally, shan zhai was used to refer to a bandit stronghold outside government
control [in imperial China]; today it is shorthand for a multitude of knockoffs, fakes, and
pirated products. These include everything from mobile phones to medicine and movies to
makeup, and they permeate China's consumer markets." EDWARD TSE, THE CHINA
STRATEGY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF THE WORLD'S FASTEST-GROWING ECONOMY 79

(2010).
243 See Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, supra note 199, at 12 ("Because
the infringing goods in these situations are of the same standard, or close to that standard,
the unauthorised production of those goods may actually result in a consumers' surplus:
consumers are now getting the same products for a much lower price.").
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More importantly, the continued development of shanzhai products
may suggest the existence of an alternative path of innovation.244 Like
the Beijing Consensus, 4 5 China's innovation models may attract the
attention of other countries that are working hard to catch up with the
developed world. Indeed, commentators have already begun to
appreciate the different forms of innovation that are slowly emerging
in China. While Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson discuss what they
have called "cost innovation, 24 6 Tan Yinglan focuses his recent book
on "process innovation. 247
Moreover, like norms identified with the "Beijing Consensus,"
"China's growing influence on accepted international [intellectual
property] norms and principles need not be explicit to have an
244 See TSE. supra note 242. at 79 ("The best shan zhai firms, which have established
themselves not through thievery but through knockoffs and imitations, have also disrupted
the status quo by inventing new and ingenious business strategies tailored specifically to
local markets."): id. at 80 (noting that shanzhai firms "have short cycle times for new
product introductions").
245 The "Beijing Consensus" is a term coined by former Time foreign editor Joshua
Ramo.

JOSHUA

COOPER

RAMO,

THE BEIJING

CONSENSUS

(2004),

available at

http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf. As he explains:
[The Beijing Consensus] is simply three theorems about how to organise the place
of a developing country in the world, along with a couple of axioms about why the
physics is attracting students in places like New Delhi and Brasilia. The first
theorem repositions the value of innovation. Rather than the "old-physics"
argument that developing countries must start development with trailing-edge
technology (copper wires), it insists that on the necessity of bleeding-edge
innovation (fiber optic) to create change that moves faster than the problems
change creates. In physics terms, it is about using innovation to reduce the frictionlosses of reform.
The second Beijing Consensus theorem is that since chaos is impossible to control
from the top you need a whole set of new tools. It looks beyond measures like percapita GDP and focuses instead of quality-of-life, the only way to manage the
massive contradictions of Chinese development. This second theorem demands a
development model where sustainability and equality become first considerations,
not luxuries. Because Chinese society is an unstable stew of hope, ambition, fear.
misinformation and politics only this kind of chaos-theory can provide meaningful
organization....
Finally, the Beijing Consensus contains a theory of self-determination, one that
stresses using leverage to move big. hegemonic powers that may be tempted to
tread on your toes.
Id. at II 12. For discussions of the Beijing Consensus, see generally id.; STEFAN A.
HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA'S AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL
DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010).
246 See generally ZENG MING & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, DRAGONS AT YOUR DOOR:
HOW CHINESE COST INNOVATION Is DISRUPTING GLOBAL COMPETITION (2007)
(advancing the concept of cost innovation and discussing its global implications).
247 TAN YINGLAN, CHINNOVATION: How CHINESE INNOVATORS ARE CHANGING THE

WORLD xii (2011).
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impact. ' 248 As Derek Mitchell reminds us in the non-intellectual
property context, "the Chinese development model has gained
currency simply because of China's apparent success, and the
attractiveness of China's hands-off standards-free policy to
authoritarian leaders and even some populations tired of perceived
heavy-handedness and condescension from Western aid donors. ' 49
Indeed, if China's phenomenal success in the science and technology
areas continues, one has to wonder whether countries will begin to
consider China's model as a viable alternative. If these countries do
so, Europe and the United States will face a formidable alternative for
the first time since the end of the Cold War.25 °
In sum, the opportunities for China to make new international
intellectual property norms or shape them to its benefit remain wide
open. If China moves into Phase 3 at full speed, the international
intellectual property regime we will have in the future is likely to be
very different from the one we have today.
CONCLUSION

This Article outlines the path of norm engagement China has taken
in the international intellectual property arena. Although piracy and
counterfeiting remain major problems within the country, China is not
the traditional norm breaker one typically infers from its

248 BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA'S RISE, supra note 86, at 225.
249 Id.; MARK LEONARD, WHAT DOES CHINA THINK? 122 (2008) (stating that, in
recent years. "[g]ovemnent research teams from Iran to Egypt. Angola to Zambia,
Kazakhstan to Russia, India to Vietnam and Brazil to Venezuela have been crawling
around the Chinese cities and countryside in search of lessons from Beijing's
experience."): RAMO. supra note 245. at 3 ("China is marking a path for other nations
around the world who are trying to figure out not simply how to develop their countries,
but also how to fit into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly
independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with a single
massively powerful centre of gravity."); Michael A. Glosny, Stabilizing the Backyard.
Recent Developments in China's Policy Toward Southeast Asia, in CHINA AND THE
DEVELOPING WORLD, Supra note 117, at 150, 167 ("For economically backward states
with Communist or authoritarian political systems, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,
and Vietnam, China's development path has become an object of study and emulation.");
Ndubisi Obiorah et al., "PeacefulRise" and Human Rights: China's Expanding Relations
with Nigeria, in CHINA INTO AFRICA, supra note 122, at 272, 289 ("'China [had] become
... a good model for Nigeria in its quest for an authentic and stable development ideology
.... China [was] a lesson to Nigeria on the enormous good that a focused and patriotic
leadership can do to realise the dreams of prosperity and security for the citizens.'"
(alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Ken Nnamani, Nigerian Senate
President)).
250 Cf. LEONARD, supra note 249. at 134 ("For the first time since the end of the Cold
War, Europe and America face a formidable alternative: the Chinese model.").
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disappointing record of intellectual property protection. Instead, the
country has been a norm taker for most of its participation in the
international intellectual property regime. As its strength, experience,
and self-confidence grow, it slowly assumes the additional roles of a
norm shaker and a norm maker.
Studying China's path of norm engagement is important because it
enables us to ask important questions about the success and
limitations of the international intellectual property regime. Can the
TRIPS Agreement and other international intellectual property
treaties provide meaningful protection to intellectual property rights
holders in China? Are China's existing piracy and counterfeiting
problems caused by its inadequate compliance with these
agreements? Or are they caused instead by deficiencies in the
agreements? Regardless of the reason, what could we do to improve
the agreements to ensure greater protection of authors and inventors?
These are all questions important to intellectual property rights
holders and their supportive governments. Indeed, the lack of success
in using multilateral agreements to strengthen intellectual property
protection and enforcement has led policymakers, industries, and
commentators to push for greater use of nonmultilateral
arrangements, including ACTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement, which is still under negotiation. 251 Rights holders have
also actively explored the use of extra-legal measures, such as
restrictive contracts, technological measures, and private ordering, to
obtain what they could not through international treaties.252
One question that policymakers, industries, and commentators
have rarely explored is what will happen if the economic and
technological conditions in China continue to improve to the point
that the TRIPS Agreement and other international intellectual
property treaties will favor China at the expense of the European
Union, Japan, the United States, and other existing intellectual
251 See Trans-Pacific Partnership. OFFICE OF THE U. S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (providing updated information about
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement). See generally Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The
Trans-PacificPartnership:New Paradigmor Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?. 34 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 27 (2011) (discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement).
252 See Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in
Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81 (2010) (discussing the use of private
ordering among intellectual property rights holders and Internet service providers); Peter
K. Yu, Five Disharmonizing Trends in the InternationalIntellectual PropertyRegime, in 4
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE

DIGITAL AGE 73, 91-96 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (discussing the trend of rights holders
using mass-market contracts and technological protection measures).
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property powers. 5 3 This scenario seems far-fetched to many.
However, given China's rapid economic rise and its many notable
developments in the science and technology areas, 254 it is only a
matter of time before China becomes a major intellectual property
power with a considerable amount of homegrown intellectual
property.
Today, China is already among the top five countries filing patent
applications through the PCT.255 In 2010, the number of PCT
applications increased by 56.2% to 12,337, moving China to the
fourth spot, behind only the United States, Japan, and Germany. 256
With significant backing of the Chinese government and significant
involvement of a large public sector, China may be able to catch up
with the existing intellectual property powers more quickly than one
expects. Indeed, if China successfully reaches the 2015 goals set by
SIPO:
The annual quantity of applying for patents for inventions, utility
models and designs [in the country] will reach 2 million. China will
rank among the top two in the world in terms of the annual number
of patents for inventions granted to the domestic applicants, and the
quality of patents filed will further improve. The number of owning
253 As John Orcutt and Hong Shen recently observed, China has made the following
notable achievements in space technology, biotechnology (including genomics and stem
cell research), information technology, nanotechnology, and advanced energy technology:

* China is one of only three countries to put a person in space with its own rockets
(and China recently conducted its first spacewalk).
* Chinese research teams helped to map the genome for rice and have since helped
to extend genomic sequencing to other plants, as well as a variety of insects and
parasites.
* China passed the United States as the leading exporter of information-technology
goods in 2004.
* China has become a world leader in the field of nanotechnology producing
major nanotechnology breakthroughs (e.g., improved production of carbon nanotubes) and generating a significant portion of the world's nanotechnology
publications and patents and new nanotechnology firms.
* China has long been a leader in nuclear technology and is positioned to become a
leader in a number of other energy fields, including clean coal and hydropower.
JOHN L. ORCUIT & HONG SHEN, SHAPING CHINA'S INNOVATION FUTURE: UNIVERSITY
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN TRANSITION vii ix (2011).
254 See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 55, at 185 88 (tracing the development of the
intellectual property regime in China): Yu. From Piratesto Partners11, supra note 74. at
975-99 (examining the progress China has made in the intellectual property area).
255 Press Release, World Intellectual. Prop. Org., International Patent Filings Recover
in 2010 (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2011
/article 0004.html.
256 Id. The figures for the United States, Japan. and Germany are 44.855, 32.156, and
17,171, respectively.
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patents every one million people and the number of overseas patent
applications filed by Chinese applicants will double. The proportion
of patent applications in industrial enterprises above designated size
will reach 8% and the quantity of owning patent rights will
significantly rise. . . . The patent transaction services will be
established in major cities of China with annual patent transaction
amounts reaching 100 billion yuan ....
The patent examiner[s] will
reach 9,000 ....
The talents in the patent service industry will be
greater and the professional categories will be more complete, with
certified patent agents reaching 10,000.257
Moreover, macroeconomic structures are constantly changing. In
the near future, the economic structure of the United States-and for
that matter, the European Union, Japan, or other existing developed
countries-could depend more on innovation than existing forms of
intellectual property rights. If firms like Apple, Google, and Facebook
are, indeed, driving the U.S. economy, as opposed to, say, the U.S.
film and pharmaceutical industries, one has to wonder how much the
existing international intellectual property system will still benefit the

United States.258
Finally, norms and values in the international intellectual property
regime are highly dynamic. As with most areas in the international
regulatory system, intellectual property norms are not developed in a
vacuum. Virtually all international intellectual property agreements
reflect compromises struck between and among key negotiating
parties. Thus, the role China will play in the international intellectual
property regime will also depend on the roles the European Union,
India, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, the United States, and others
will play. The more we understand China's participation in the
international intellectual property regime and its role in the WTO and
257 STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE (CHINA), NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT

STRATEGY (2011 2020) 3 (2011), translated at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages
/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf; see also Steve Lohr. When Innovation, Too,
Is Made in China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02
/business/02unboxed.html (stating that USPTO Director David Kappos described SIPO's
2015 targets as "mind-blowing numbers").
258 As Christopher May writes:
[A]s the balance of technical leadership starts to move, perhaps accelerated by the
impact of the recession on research and innovation in the most-developed countries
(the US, Europe, and Japan). it is not clear that those states that previously argued
for robust protection of 1PRs will necessarily find themselves so advantaged by the
current settlement. If the TRIPs agreement and the work of WIPO has largely in the
past privileged the interests and benefits of the technological leaders in the global
economy. what happens when this leadership starts to shift?
Christopher May. Afterword to IMPLEMENTING WIPO's DEVELOPMENT AGENDA. supra
note 210, at 172.
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WIPO, the clearer and more nuanced picture we will have of what the
future will hold for this particular regime.

